花逍遥

マユミ（檀、真弓、檀弓、学名：Euonymus hamiltonianus）

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-27189951
9 June 2014 Last updated at 23:06



Did Korea encourage sex work at US bases?
The rubbish collector left on the scrap heap as his city goes green
How I drank urine and bat blood to survive
Left to the mercy of the Taliban
Koreans could once be sure that their children would look after them in their old age, but no longer - many of those who worked hard to transform the country's economy find the next generation has other spending priorities. As a result, some elderly women are turning to prostitution.





Kim Eun-ja sits on the steps at Seoul's Jongno-3 subway station, scanning the scene in front of her. The 71-year-old's bright lipstick and shiny red coat stand out against her papery skin.

Beside her is a large bag, from which comes the clink of glass bottles as she shifts on the cold concrete.

Mrs Kim is one of South Korea's "Bacchus Ladies" - older women who make a living by selling tiny bottles of the popular Bacchus energy drink to male customers.

But often that's not all they're selling. At an age when Korean grandmothers are supposed to be venerated as matriarchs, some are selling sex.

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“
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I can't trust my children to help - they're in deep trouble because they have to start preparing for their old age”

Mr Kim
"You see those Bacchus Ladies standing over there?" she asks me. "Those ladies sell more than Bacchus. They sometimes go out with the grandpas and earn money from them. But I don't make a living like that.

"Men do proposition me when I'm standing in the alleyway," she adds. "But I always say, 'No.'"

Mrs Kim says she makes about 5,000 Won ($5, or £3) a day selling the drinks. "Drink up fast," she says. "The police are always watching me. They don't differentiate."

The centre of this underground sex trade is a nearby park in the heart of Seoul. Jongmyo Park is a place where elderly men come to while away their sunset years with a little chess and some local gossip.

Men playing board game in Jongmyo park
It's built around a temple to Confucius, whose ideas on venerating elders have shaped Korean culture for centuries. But under the budding trees outside, the fumbling transactions of its elderly men and women tell the real story of Korean society in the 21st Century.

Women in their 50s, 60, even their 70s, stand around the edges of the park, offering drinks to the men. Buy one, and it's the first step in a lonely journey that ends in a cheap motel nearby.

The men in the park are more willing to talk to me than the women.

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Find out more

Stock image of Korean woman (posed by model)
Listen to Lucy Williamson's report for Assignment on the BBC World Service on Thursday - or catch up later on the BBC iPlayer

Standing around a game of Korean chess, a group of grandfathers watch the match intently. About half the men here use the Bacchus Ladies, they say.

"We're men, so we're curious about women," says 60-year-old Mr Kim.

"We have a drink, and slip a bit of money into their hands, and things happen!" he cackles. "Men like to have women around - whether they're old or not, sexually active or not. That's just male psychology."

Another man, 81 years old, excitedly showed me his spending money for the day. "It's for drinking with my friends," he said. "We can find girlfriends here, too - from those women standing over there. They'll ask us to play with them. They say, 'Oh, I don't have any money,' and then they glue on to us. Sex with them costs 20,000 to 30,000 Won (£11-17), but sometimes they'll give you a discount if they know you."

South Korea's grandparents are victims of their country's economic success.

As they worked to create Korea's economic miracle, they invested their savings in the next generation. In a Confucian society, successful children are the best form of pension.

But attitudes here have changed just as fast as living standards, and now many young people say they can't afford to support themselves and their parents in Korea's fast-paced, highly competitive society.

Woman and ad for Korean smartphone
The government, caught out by this rapid change, is scrambling to provide a welfare system that works. In the meantime, the men and women in Jongmyo Park have no savings, no realistic pension, and no family to rely on. They've become invisible - foreigners in their own land.

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“
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One Bacchus woman said to me 'I'm hungry, I don't need respect, I don't need honour, I just want three meals a day'”

Dr Lee Ho-Sun
"Those who rely on their children are stupid," says Mr Kim. "Our generation was submissive to our parents. We respected them. The current generation is more educated and experienced, so they don't listen to us.

"I'm 60 years old and I don't have any money. I can't trust my children to help. They're in deep trouble because they have to start preparing for their old age. Almost all of the old folks here are in the same situation."

Most Bacchus women have only started selling sex later in life, as a result of this new kind of old-age poverty, according to Dr Lee Ho-Sun, who is perhaps the only researcher to have studied them in detail.

One woman she interviewed first turned to prostitution at the age of 68. About 400 women work in the park, she says, all of whom will have been taught as children that respect and honour were worth more than anything.

"One Bacchus woman said to me 'I'm hungry, I don't need respect, I don't need honour, I just want three meals a day," Lee says.

Police, who routinely patrol the area but are rarely able to make an arrest, privately say this problem will never be solved by crackdowns, that senior citizens need an outlet for stress and sexual desire, and that policy needs to change.

But law-enforcement isn't the only problem.

Graffiti on the street showing an elderly couple kissing
Graffiti on a street on Seoul
Inside those bags the Bacchus Ladies carry is the source of a hidden epidemic: a special injection supposed to help older men achieve erections - delivered directly into the vein. Dr Lee confirms that the needles aren't disposed of afterwards, but used again - 10 or 20 times.

The results, she says, can be seen in one local survey, which found that almost 40% of the men tested had a sexually transmitted disease¬ despite the fact that some of the most common diseases weren't included in the test. With most sex education classes aimed at teenagers, this has the makings of a real problem. Some local governments have now begun offering sex education clinics especially for seniors.

Hidden in a dingy warren of alleyways in central Seoul, is the place where these lonely journeys end - the narrow corridors of a "love motel" and one of the grey rooms which open off them.

Inside, a large bed takes up most of the space, its thin mattress and single pillow hardly inviting a long night's sleep. On the bed-head is a sticker: for room service press zero; for pornography press three; and if you want the electric blanket, you'll find the wire on the far side of the bed.

So here you have food, sex, and even a little warmth all at the touch of a button. If only it were that simple outside the motel room, in South Korea's rich, hi-tech society.

But for the grandparents who built its fearsome economy, food is expensive, sex is cheap, and human warmth rarely available at any price.





http://www.koreabang.com/2013/stories/north-korean-defector-working-as-prostitute-found-dead-in-motel.html


North Korean Defector Working as Prostitute Found Dead in Motel
by Harald Olsen on Thursday, March 28, 2013 72 comments
defector prostituteTwo defectors leave a car, from a 2012 photo essay by Kim Jong Taek



Earlier this month, the body of a defector and known prostitute was found in a motel room in the city of Hwaseong, sparking debate regarding the treatment of North Koreans who come to the South.

The murderer turned himself in to the police within 24 hours of the crime he said he had committed ‘in a fit of anger’ when the woman refused to participate in a ‘perverted’ sex act.

The story of the woman’s difficult journey to South Korea, leaving the North in 2002 with her siblings and passing through Cambodia before finally arriving in the South won the sympathy of many netizens who hoped she could be ‘reborn’ into a better life. The fact that the murderer already had 16 convictions incited outrage and renewed calls for greater use of the death penalty.

Prostitution can be a common path for female defectors, experts cited in articles covering the incident said. The women, who often need to repay smugglers who extract them from the North and guide them through China, can become easily recruited by other defectors who have themselves turned to prostitution.

From Yonhap News:

Tragedy as defector forced into prostitution is murdered
The tragic story of a female defector strangled by one of her clients has recently emerged. The woman, who worked in a tea house, was delivering tea to a client when she was strangled.

The manager of a motel in the city of Hwaseong in Gyeonggi Province, found Ms. Kim, age forty-five, in one of his rooms at 11:20 p.m. on the night of March 17th.

The assailant has been identified as a Mr. Lee, who checked into a room at the motel at 2:00 p.m.

According to the police, Lee was driven to strangle Ms. Kim after she rejected his request for a perverted sex act after he had paid her and they were engaged in sexual relations. Angered by the rejection, Lee suddenly attacked the woman and strangled her.

Lee turned himself in on the 18th and admitted his crime. The police immediately arrested him for the charge of murder.

Kim had left North Korea with three of her siblings in 2002.

After spending two years in China, Kim sought asylum in Cambodia in May of 2004. Embracing dreams of ‘new life in South Korea’, she arrived in Incheon Airport in June of the same year and began a new life.

While Kim never formally married, she set up a home in the city of Suwon. However, her ‘second life’ was not to last for very long. After nine years in South Korea, her life ended in tragedy.

The police report contained comments from an employee at the tea house, ‘Ms. Kim had been working here for the past two days, she also came here to work about twenty days ago…When she first came looking for work she mentioned that she had worked at a hair salon in the past.’

defector prostitute2

Female defectors making the journey to South Korea through another intermediary country often experience severe mental and physical harm, which may not end even after they have started a new life.

In a 2012 Yonsei University School of Welfare study commissioned by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 26.4% of surveyed female defectors between the ages of twenty and fifty showed signs of psychological depression, (37 of the 140 respondents).

14.3% of the survey respondents said that they had been the victim of sexual assault, molestation, or sexual violence while they were living in North Korea. The percentage of respondents who said they had suffered injury while traveling through a third country was even higher at 17.9%. 12.1% of respondents said they had suffered after arriving in South Korea.

According to Kim Jae-yeob, Dean of the Yonsei University Graduate School of Welfare, ‘Female defectors endure violence not only while they are in North Korea or while traveling through a third county, but also after they move to South Korea. This violence becomes a very serious threat to their independence. He emphasised the need for a plan that would provide customised support to female defectors who have suffered violence.




http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2013/03/18/0200000000AKR20130318189200061.HTML?input=1179m

<성매매 내몰렸다 살해된 탈북 여성의 비극>

(화성=연합뉴스) 이우성 기자 = 여관으로 차 배달을 갔다가 투숙객에게 목 졸려 살해된 탈북자 출신 다방 여종업원의 사연이 주위를 안타깝게 하고 있다.

경기도 화성의 한 다방에서 여종업원으로 일하던 탈북 여성 김모(45)씨는 17일 오후 11시 20분께 다방 인근 한 여관 객실에서 목 졸려 숨진 채 여관 지배인에 의해 발견됐다.

범인은 오후 2시께 여관에 투숙한 이모(34·무직)씨.


이씨가 경찰에서 밝힌 살해동기는 돈을 주고 성매매를 제안해 성관계를 갖다가 변태적 성행위를 요구했는데, 김씨가 욕을 하며 거부해 홧김에 목을 졸라 살해했다는 것이다.

경찰은 18일 오전 자수해 범행 사실을 털어놓은 이씨를 긴급체포한 뒤 살인 등 혐의로 구속영장을 신청했다.

숨진 김씨는 2002년 언니 등 형제 3명과 함께 탈북했다.

중국에서 2년여 동안 머물다가 2004년 5월 캄보디아로 망명한 뒤 '남한 사회'에 대한 꿈을 안고 같은 해 6월 인천공항을 통해 남한에 들어와 정착했다.

2∼3년 전 탈북자 출신인 남자를 만나 가정도 꾸렸다.

혼인 신고는 하지 않았지만 수원에 보금자리를 마련해 '제2의 인생'을 꿈꾸던 김씨의 삶은 오래가지 않았다. 남한 생활은 9년 만에 비극으로 막을 내렸다.

다방 관계자는 경찰 조사에서 "김씨는 16일부터 이틀간 나와 일했고, 20여일 전에도 이틀만 일했었다"며 "일자리를 구하려고 처음 찾아왔을 때 미용 일을 했었다고 했다"며 안타까워했다.

탈북 여성들은 북한에서 제3국을 거쳐 남한 사회에 정착하는 과정에서 심각한 정신적, 신체적 피해를 경험하고 있다.

여성가족부가 연세대 사회복지대학원에 의뢰해 지난해 3∼8월 20∼50대 탈북 여성 140명을 대상으로 조사한 결과에 따르면 전체의 26.4%(37명)가 주요 우울 장애로 의심되는 심리상태를 보였다.

응답자의 14.3%(20명)는 북한 체류 당시에 성폭행이나 성추행 등 성폭력에 시달린 것으로 조사됐다. 제3국을 통한 탈북 과정이나 남한 정착 후 피해를 봤다는 응답자도 각각 17.9%(25명), 12.1%(17명)에 달했다.

당시 조사결과를 내놓은 김재엽 연세대 사회복지대학원장은 "북한과 제3국 경유 과정뿐만 아니라 남한에 이주한 이후에도 계속 경험하는 폭력 피해는 탈북여성의 자립에 심각한 장애요인이 되고 있다"며 폭력피해 탈북여성에 대한 맞춤형 자립지원 방안의 필요성을 강조한 바 있다.

gaonnuri@yna.co.kr

<저작권자(c)연합뉴스. 무단전재-재배포금지.>2013/03/18 19:43 송고

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/world/asia/japanese-right-attacks-newspaper-on-the-left-emboldening-war-revisionists.html?_r=0

Rewriting the War, Japanese Right Attacks a Newspaper
By MARTIN FACKLERDEC. 2, 2014
Photo


Takashi Uemura, a former journalist, is under attack for his reporting on “comfort women.” Credit Ko Sasaki for The New York Times
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SAPPORO, Japan — Takashi Uemura was 33 when he wrote the article that would make his career. Then an investigative reporter for The Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s second-largest newspaper, he examined whether the Imperial Army had forced women to work in military brothels during World War II. His report, under the headline “Remembering Still Brings Tears,” was one of the first to tell the story of a former “comfort woman” from Korea.

Fast-forward a quarter century, and that article has made Mr. Uemura, now 56 and retired from journalism, a target of Japan’s political right. Tabloids brand him a traitor for disseminating “Korean lies” that they say were part of a smear campaign aimed at settling old scores with Japan. Threats of violence, Mr. Uemura says, have cost him one university teaching job and could soon rob him of a second. Ultranationalists have even gone after his children, posting Internet messages urging people to drive his teenage daughter to suicide.

The threats are part of a broad, vitriolic assault by the right-wing news media and politicians here on The Asahi, which has long been the newspaper that Japanese conservatives love to hate. The battle is also the most recent salvo in a long-raging dispute over Japan’s culpability for its wartime behavior that has flared under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s right-leaning government.

This latest campaign, however, has gone beyond anything postwar Japan has seen before, with nationalist politicians, including Mr. Abe himself, unleashing a torrent of abuse that has cowed one of the last strongholds of progressive political influence in Japan. It has also emboldened revisionists calling for a reconsideration of the government’s 1993 apology for the wartime coercion of women into prostitution.

“They are using intimidation as a way to deny history,” said Mr. Uemura, who spoke with a pleading urgency and came to an interview in this northern city with stacks of papers to defend himself. “They want to bully us into silence.”

“The War on The Asahi,” as commentators have called it, began in August when the newspaper bowed to public criticism and retracted at least a dozen articles published in the 1980s and early ’90s. Those articles cited a former soldier, Seiji Yoshida, who claimed to have helped abduct Korean women for the military brothels. Mr. Yoshida was discredited two decades ago, but the Japanese right pounced on The Asahi’s gesture and called for a boycott to drive the 135-year-old newspaper out of business.

Speaking to a parliamentary committee in October, Mr. Abe said The Asahi’s “mistaken reporting had caused many people injury, sorrow, pain and anger. It wounded Japan’s image.”

With elections this month, analysts say conservatives are trying to hobble the nation’s leading left-of-center newspaper. The Asahi has long supported greater atonement for Japan’s wartime militarism and has opposed Mr. Abe on other issues. But it is increasingly isolated as the nation’s liberal opposition remains in disarray after a crushing defeat at the polls two years ago.

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Mr. Abe and his political allies have also seized on The Asahi’s woes as a long-awaited chance to go after bigger game: the now internationally accepted view that the Japanese military coerced tens of thousands of Korean and other foreign women into sexual slavery during the war.

Most mainstream historians agree that the Imperial Army treated women in conquered territories as spoils of battle, rounding them up to work in a system of military-run brothels known as comfort stations that stretched from China to the South Pacific. Many were deceived with offers of jobs in factories and hospitals and then forced to provide sex for imperial soldiers in the comfort stations. In Southeast Asia, there is evidence that Japanese soldiers simply kidnapped women to work in the brothels.

Among the women who have come forward to say they were forced to have sex with soldiers are Chinese, Koreans and Filipinos, as well as Dutch women captured in Indonesia, then a Dutch colony.

There is little evidence that the Japanese military abducted or was directly involved in entrapping women in Korea, which had been a Japanese colony for decades when the war began, although the women and activists who support them say the women were often deceived and forced to work against their will.

The revisionists, however, have seized on the lack of evidence of abductions to deny that any women were held captive in sexual slavery and to argue that the comfort women were simply camp-following prostitutes out to make good money.

For scholars of the comfort women issue, the surprise was not The Asahi’s conclusion that Mr. Yoshida had lied — the newspaper acknowledged in 1997 that it could not verify his account — but that it waited so long to issue a formal retraction. Employees at The Asahi said it finally acted because members of the Abe government had been using the articles to criticize its reporters, and it hoped to blunt the attacks by setting the record straight.

Instead, the move prompted a storm of denunciations and gave the revisionists a new opening to promote their version of history. They are also pressing a claim that has left foreign experts scratching their heads in disbelief: that The Asahi alone is to blame for persuading the world that the comfort women were victims of coercion.

Though dozens of women have come forward with testimony about their ordeals, the Japanese right contends it was The Asahi’s reporting that resulted in international condemnation of Japan, including a 2007 resolution by the United States House of Representatives calling on Japan to apologize for “one of the largest cases of human trafficking in the 20th century.”

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For conservatives, humbling The Asahi is also a way to advance their long-held agenda of erasing portrayals of Imperial Japan that they consider too negative and eventually overturning the 1993 apology to comfort women, analysts say. Many on the right have argued that Japan’s behavior was no worse than that of other World War II combatants, including the United States’ bombing of Japanese civilians.

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“The Asahi’s admission is a chance for the revisionist right to say: ‘See! We told you so!’ ” said Koichi Nakano, a political scientist at Sophia University in Tokyo. “Abe sees this as his chance to go after a historical issue that he believes has hurt Japan’s national honor.”

The Asahi’s conservative competitor, The Yomiuri Shimbun, the world’s highest-circulation newspaper, has capitalized on its rival’s troubles by distributing leaflets that highlight The Asahi’s mistakes in reporting on comfort women. Since August, The Asahi’s daily circulation has dropped by 230,797 to about seven million, according to the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulations.

Right-wing tabloids have gone further, singling out Mr. Uemura as a “fabricator of the comfort women” even though his article was not among those that The Asahi retracted.

Mr. Uemura said The Asahi had been too fearful to defend him, or even itself. In September, the newspaper’s top executives apologized on television and fired the chief editor.

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“Abe is using The Asahi’s problems to intimidate other media into self-censorship,” said Jiro Yamaguchi, a political scientist who helped organize a petition to support Mr. Uemura. “This is a new form of McCarthyism.”

Hokusei Gakuen University, a small Christian college where Mr. Uemura lectures on local culture and history, said it was reviewing his contract because of bomb threats by ultranationalists. On a recent afternoon, some of Mr. Uemura’s supporters gathered to hear a sermon warning against repeating the mistakes of the dark years before the war, when the nation trampled dissent.

Mr. Uemura did not attend, explaining that he was now reluctant to appear in public. “This is the right’s way of threatening other journalists into silence,” he said. “They don’t want to suffer the same fate that I have.”

A version of this article appears in print on December 3, 2014, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Rewriting War, Japanese Right Goes on Attack. Order Reprints| Today's Paper|Subscribe

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2014120300365
河野談話見直し狙う＝米紙、「歴史修正主義」を批判


　【ニューヨーク時事】米紙ニューヨーク・タイムズ（電子版）は２日、従軍慰安婦に関する記事取り消しをめぐる日本国内の「朝日新聞攻撃」を取り上げ、この風潮は歴史修正主義者を大胆にしており、安倍晋三首相らは慰安婦問題で謝罪した１９９３年の河野洋平官房長官談話を見直すチャンスだと捉えていると批判的に報じた。
　同紙は、慰安婦の記事を書いた元朝日新聞記者とその家族や勤務先が脅迫の対象になっていると指摘。「彼ら（歴史修正主義者）は歴史否定のため脅迫を活用し、われわれを沈黙させたがっている」との元記者の話を伝えた。　
　ニューヨーク・タイムズは「日本軍が韓国で女性を拉致したという証拠はほとんどない」と認めつつ、「しかし歴史修正主義者はそれをもって、彼女たちが捕らわれの性奴隷だったことを否定し、金もうけ目的の売春婦だったと主張している」と指摘。多くの元慰安婦の証言があるにもかかわらず、日本の右翼は、朝日報道が国際的非難を生んだと批判しているとした。
　同紙は慰安婦問題で日本に厳しい論説をしばしば載せており、朝日新聞による８月の記事取り消し後もその論調は全く変わっていない。（2014/12/03-12:25）

トクサ（砥草、木賊、学名：Equisetum hyemale）は、シダ植物門トクサ科トクサ属の植物

merry christm

墨手前

http://m.blog.daum.net/_blog/_m/articleView.do?blogid=03aXq&articleno=15851915

한국군도 '위안부'운용했다????
黃薔(李相遠) | 2013.08.06 05:26 목록 크게
댓글쓰기
한국군도 '위안부'운용했다
[창간 2주년 발굴특종 ①] 일본군 종군 경험의 유산
02.02.22 15:16l최종 업데이트 02.02.26 21:51l
김당(dangk)

Korean military also operated "comfort women system"
[anniversary excavation scoop, launched 2 ①]
heritage of the Japanese military veteran status



한국전쟁 기간[1951∼1954년] 3∼4개 중대 규모 운영…연간 최소 20여만 병력 '위안'

흔히 전쟁이 나면 여성들은 남성들에 비해 고통을 한 가지 더 겪는 것이 보통이다. 이는 다름아닌 '성적 유린'인데, 피아 군인을 가릴 것 없이 자행되는 것이 보통이다. 이같은 여성들의 피해사례는 동서고금의 전쟁사 곳곳에 기록돼 있다.

흔히 '위안부'라면 일제하 구 일본군들이 조선(한국)여성들을 강제로 끌고가 중국, 남양군도 등에서 성적 노리개로 부린 것으로만 생각하기 쉽다. 그러나 한국전쟁 당시 한국군도 병사들의 사기진작 차원에서 '위안부'를 운용했다는 주장이 제기돼 충격을 던지고 있다.

당시 서울, 강릉 등지의 군부대에서는 중대단위로 '위안부대'를 편성, 운용했는데 병사들은 '위안 대가'로 티킷이나 현금을 사용한 것으로 드러났다.

<오마이뉴스>는 우리 현대사에서 묻혀진 역사의 진실을 밝힌다는 차원에서 전문학자의 연구결과와 김당 편집위원의 취재를 토대로 4회 정도의 관련기획물을 실을 예정이다.-<편집자 주>




▲ 위안소 앞에 줄지어 선 일본군 병사들. 예비역 장성들의 회고록에 따르면 한국전쟁 당시 국군 장병들도 24인용 야전막사니 분대천막 앞에서 이처럼 줄을 서서 위안대를 이용했다. 한국전쟁 당시 국군이 군 위안소를 두고 위안부 제도를 운영했다는 주장이 학계에서 처음으로 공식 제기되었다. 6·25 전쟁 당시 국군이 위안소를 두고 장병들이 이용케 했다는 주장은 그 동안 몇몇 예비역 장군의 회고록과 참전자들의 증언에 의해서도 뒷받침되어 왔다.

그러나 군 당국이 편찬한 공식기록(전사) 등을 근거로 한국군이 위안대를 설치·운영했다는 주장이 제기된 것은 이번이 처음이다. 또 이를 계기로 당시 위안부 피해자들의 증언과 진상 규명운동이 전개될 경우, 지난 90년대 일본군 종군위안부 문제가 처음 제기된 때와 유사한 파문도 예상된다.

김귀옥 박사(경남대 북한전문대학원 객원교수·사회학)는 2월23일 일본 교토 리츠메이칸(立命館)대학에서 열리는 제5회 '동아시아 평화와 인권 국제심포지움'에서 이런 내용을 담은 '한국전쟁과 여성ː군 위안부와 군 위안소를 중심으로'라는 제목의 논문을 발표한다(관련 인터뷰 기사 송고 예정).

김박사의 논문은 한국군(한국전쟁) 위안부 문제라는 사안의 특성상 일본 언론들과 재일본조선인총련합회(총련)계 언론의 큰 관심을 끌 것으로 보여 귀추가 주목된다.


"사기 앙양과 전투력 손실 방지를 위한 필요악"

현재까지 발굴된 한국전쟁 당시 군 위안부 제도의 실체를 보여주는 유일한 공식자료는 육군본부가 지난 1956년에 편찬한 <후방전사(인사편)>에 실린 군 위안대 관련 기록이다.

김박사는 <후방전사> 기록과 예비역 장성들의 회고록, 그리고 관계자 증언 등을 토대로 당시 국군은 직접 설치한 고정식 위안소와 이동식 위안소 그리고 사창(私娼)의 직업여성들을 이용하는 세 가지 방식으로 위안부 제도를 운영했다고 주장한다. 우선 <후방전사(인사편)>의 '제3장 1절 3항 특수위안활동 사항'기록을 보면 군 위안대 설치 목적은 다음과 같다.

"표면화한 사리(事理)만을 가지고 간단히 국가시책에 역행하는 모순된 활동이라고 단안(斷案)하면 별문제이겠지만 실질적으로 사기앙양은 물론 전쟁사실에 따르는 피할 수 없는 폐단을 미연에 방지할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 장기간 교대 없는 전투로 인하여 후방 내왕(來往)이 없으니만치 이성에 대한 동경에서 야기되는 생리작용으로 인한 성격의 변화 등으로 우울증 및 기타 지장을 초래함을 예방하기 위하여 본(本) 특수위안대를 설치하게 되었다."

당시 군은 위안부들을 '특수위안대(特殊慰安隊)'라는 부대 형식으로 편제해 운영했음을 알 수 있다. <후방전사> 제3장의 '특수위안활동 사항'에는 흔히 '딴따라'라고 부르는 군예대(軍藝隊) 활동도 포함된다.

따라서 '특수위안대'는 군예대를 지칭하는 것이 아니냐는 이론도 있을 수 있다. 그러나 <후방전사>는 군예대의 활동을 '위문 공연(慰問 公演)'이라고 표현하는 반면에 특수위안대의 활동은 '위안(慰安)'이라고 용어를 구분해 사용하고 있다. 결국 여기서 '특수위안'은 여성의 성(性)적 서비스를 뜻함을 어렵지 않게 알 수 있다.

흥미로운 사실은 전사(戰史)에서 위안대 운영이 "국가시책에 역행하는 모순된 활동"임을 인정한 대목이다. 이는 일제시대에 설치된 공창(公娼)이 1948년 2월 미군정청의 공창폐지령 발효로 폐쇄되었음에도 국가를 수호하는 군이 자체적으로 사실상의 공창(군 위안대)을 운영하는 모순된 활동, 즉 범법행위를 자행했음을 의미한다.

따라서 <후방전사>는 군이 한국전쟁 당시 위안부 제도를 전쟁의 장기화에 따른 전투력 손실 방지와 사기 앙양을 위해 불가피한 일종의 '필요악'으로 간주했음을 드러내고 있는 것이다.

결국 한국군 위안대는 그 동원방식이나 운영기간 및 규모 면에서 일본군 종군위안부 제도와 근본적인 차이점이 있음에도 불구하고, 그 설치 목적이나 운영 방식 면에서는 비슷함을 보여준다. 이는 또 당시 한국군 수뇌부의 상당수가 일본군 출신이었음을 감안할 때 시사하는 바 크다. 일본군에서 위안부 제도를 경험한 군 수뇌부가 한국전쟁 기간에 위안부 제도를 주도적으로 도입한 것은 어쩌면 자연스런 경험의 산물이기 때문이다.

그런데 <후방전사>에 따르면 위안대를 설치한 시기는 불분명하다. 다만 "동란(動亂)중 (위안대) 활동상황을 연도별로 보면 큰 차이가 없었으며 전쟁행위와 더불어 불가분의 관계를 가진 것이라고 아니할 수 없다"고 돼 있어 전쟁 이후 설치된 것임을 짐작케 한다.

김귀옥 박사는 관련 자료와 관계자들의 증언을 토대로 설치 시기를 1951년으로 추정한다. 반면에 <후방전사>는 "휴전에 따라 이러한 시설의 설치목적이 해소됨에 이르러 공창(公娼) 폐지의 조류에 순명(順命)하여 단기 4287(서기 1954)년 3월 이를 일제히 폐쇄하였다"고 그 폐쇄 시기를 분명히 밝히고 있다.


서울 강릉 춘천 원주 속초 등 7개소 설치 운영

한편 <후방전사> 기록에 따르면 위안대가 설치된 장소는 △서울지구 3개 소대 △강릉지구 1개 소대 △기타 춘천 원주 속초 등지로 총 7개소에 이른다. 그러나 위안대 규모에 대해서는 <후방전사> 내에서도 앞뒤의 기록이 달라 정확한 그 규모를 산정하기가 어렵다.

이를테면 <후방전사>의 일부 기록(148쪽)에는 위안대 규모가 △서울지구 제1소대 19명 △강릉 제2소대 31명 △제8소대 8명 △강릉 제1소대 21명 등 총 79명으로 돼 있다.

그러나 같은 책의 '특수위안대 실적통계표'(150쪽)에는 위안부 수가 △서울 제1소대 19명 △서울 제2소대 27명 △서울 제3소대 13명 △강릉 제1소대 30명 등 총 89명으로 돼 있다.

따라서 전후 맥락으로 볼 때 전자의 기록은 오기(誤記)이고 후자의 '실적 통계표'가 정확한 것으로 추정된다. 물론 이 통계도 기타(춘천 원주 속초 등지) 지역 위안대는 포함하지 않고 있다. 아무튼 기록을 토대로 당시 위안소 소재지와 규모를 <표>로 정리하면 다음과 같다.




<표 1> 한국군 위안대 설치 장소와 규모 군에 위안대를 설치한 주체가 누구인지는 <후방전사>에서 찾아볼 수 없다. 그러나 군이 위안대 설치 및 운영을 주도한 사실은 <후방전사>의 다음과 같은 대목이나 예비역 장성들의 회고록에서 미루어 짐작할 수 있다.

"일선 부대의 요청에 의하여 출동위안(出動慰安)을 행하며 소재지에서도 출입하는 장병에 대하여 위안행위에 당하였다.(……) 한편 위안부는 1주에 2회 군무관(軍務官)의 협조로 군의관의 엄격한 검진을 받고 성병에 대하여는 철저한 대책을 강구하였다."(<후방전사>)

이는 당시 군이 군인들이 위안소를 찾아와 이용하는 고정식 위안소뿐 아니라 위안대가 위안을 위해 부대를 찾아가는 이동식 위안소도 운영했음을 입증하는 대목이다. 또 군의(軍醫)가 직접 위안부를 상대로 주 1회 성병검진을 실시한 점이나 장교를 상대하는 여성과 병사를 상대하는 여성이 따로 있었다는 점 등은 한국군 위안부 제도가 과거 일본군 종군위안부 운영방식을 그대로 답습했음을 의미한다.

주월(駐越) 한국군 사령관을 지낸 채명신 장군(예비역 육군 중장)은 자신의 회고록 <사선을 넘고넘어>(1994년)에서 <후방전사>의 기록과는 달리 소대 규모가 아닌 중대 규모로 위안대를 운용했다고 적고 있다. 이는 채명신 장군이 서울지구의 3개 소대 위안부 인력을 1개 중대 규모로 계산한 결과일 수 있다. 어쨌건 채장군에 따르면 당시 위안부 규모는 180∼240명으로 추정된다.

"당시 우리 육군은 사기 진작을 위해 60여명을 1개 중대로 하는 위안부대를 서너 개 운용하고 있었다. 때문에 예비부대로 빠지기만 하면 사단 요청에 의해 모든 부대는 위안부대를 이용할 수 있었다. 그러니 5연대도 예외는 아니었고, 예비대로 빠지기도 전부터 장병들의 화제는 모두 위안부대 건이었다."(이하 밑줄은 필자 강조)




▲ <후방전사>에 실려있는 단기 4285년(서기 1952년)의 '특수위안대 실적통계표'. 89명의 위안부가 연간 20여만명의 군인을 '위안'했음을 보여준다. 그렇다면 한국전쟁 기간에 군이 설치한 이 '특수위안대'의 '위안'활동 실적은 얼마나 될까. 그것을 가늠할 수 있는 유일한 근거자료는 바로 <후방전사>(150쪽)에 실린 '특수위안부 실적통계표'이다. 단기 4285년도이니 곧 1952년도 1년간의 '위안'실적이다. 다른 해의 실적도 이와 비슷하다고 기록되어 있다.

아무튼 이 통계표에 따르면, 1952년 당시 '특수위안대'에 편성된 위안부는 89명이고, 이들로부터 '위안'을 받은 군인은 연간 20만명이 넘는 것으로 집계되었다. 다만 이 실적이 실적통계표에 적시한 4곳(서울 제1, 2, 3소대·강릉 제1소대)에 출입한 군인들의 통계인지, 위안대가 현지부대로 '출동위안'한 군인들의 통계까지 포함한 것인지는 불명확하다.




▲ <표 2> 김귀옥 박사가 수정한 1952년 특수위안대 실적통계표

'위안대'는 예비대 병력의 '제5종 보급품'

전선에서 전투를 마치고 후방으로 교대된 예비부대 병력이 위안부를 이용할 수 있었다는 사실은 다른 장군들의 회고록에서도 일치하는 대목이다. 차규헌 장군(예비역 육군 대장) 또한 자신의 회고록 <전투>(1985년)에서 예비대 시절에 겪은 이동식 군 위안소 제도를 이렇게 회상하고 있다.

"(1952년) 3월 중순의 기후는 봄을 시샘할 듯 쌀쌀했다.(……) 잔적을 완전히 소탕한 후 예비대가 되어 부대정비를 실시하고 있을 때 사단 휼병부(恤兵部)로부터 장병을 위문하러 여자위안대가 부대 숙영지 부근에 도착하였다는 통보가 있었다. 중대 인사계 보고에 의하면 이들은 24인용 야전천막에 합판과 우의로 칸막이를 한 야전침실에 수용되었다고 하며 다른 중대병사들은 열을 서면서까지 많이 이용했다고 하였다."










▲ 김희오 장군(예비역 소장)의 회고록 <인간의 향기>. 34년간의 군 생활에서 한국전쟁 당시 처음 본 공개적 군 위안소 운영 사례에 대해 '영원히 찜찜한 기억'으로 기록하고 있다. 한편 김희오 장군(예비역 육군 소장) 또한 '이동식'이긴 하지만 이와는 조금 다른 각도에서 위안부 제도를 기억하고 있다.

김장군은 군에서 직접 위안소를 설치 운영한 것이라기보다는 연대 간부들이 당시 사창가였던 '종3'(종로3가)에서 거금을 주고 위안부로 데려온 것으로 기억한다. 김장군은 자신의 자서전 <인간의 향기>(2000년)에서 그 대목을 이렇게 회고하고 있다.

"(중부전선) 수도고지 전투도 잊혀지고 도망병 발생도 진정되어 갔다. 이제 FTX(야전훈련)에 본격 돌입하기 위해 소화기 및 장비 점검, 보급품 정비 등이 한창 진행되는 어느 날 아침이었다. 연대1과에서 중대별 제5종 보급품(군 보급품은 1∼4종밖에 없었음) 수령지시가 있어 가 보았더니 우리 중대에도 주간 8시간 제한으로 6명의 위안부가 배정되어 왔다.(……) 그러나 나는 백주에 많은 사람이 오가는 가운데 줄을 서서 분대천막을 이용하는 것이라던가 또 도덕적으로나 양심상 어정쩡하기도 해서 썩 내키지가 않았다. 먼저 소대에 2명이 할당되고 그중 1명이 먼저 소대장 천막으로 배정되어 왔다. 나는 출신환경 등 몇 마디 대화만 나누고 별로 도와줄 방법이 없어 그 동안 모아 놓았던 건빵 한 보따리를 싸서 선임하사관에게 인계하였다."




▲ 김희오 장군 두 장군의 증언에 따르면 군 부대에 소위 '제5종 보급품'이라는 이름으로 위안부들이 배정되어 왔고 24인용 야전천막이 위안소로 가설(차규헌 장군)되거나 분대 막사를 위안소로 대용(김희오 장군)하였다.

위안대가 '제5종 보급품'취급을 받은 것은 일본군 종군위안부가 '천황의 하사품'이나 '군수품'으로 취급받은 점과 일맥상통한다. 또 병사들이 줄을 서면서까지 많이 이용한 것이나 소대장 천막으로 먼저 배정된 후에 병사들에게 배정된 점 등도 일본군 종군위안부 피해자들이 증언하는 위안소의 풍경과 닮은꼴이다.

운영 방식은 증언에 따라 조금 다르다. 채명신 장군에 따르면 전선에서의 위안부대 출입은 '티켓제'로 운용토록 하였다. 그런데 아무에게나 티켓이 주어지는 것 아니었다. 전쟁터에서 용감하게 싸워 공을 세운 순서대로 나눠주었다. 또 공훈의 정도에 따라 티켓의 숫자가 달라졌다고 한다. 이는 군인들이 군표나 현금을 주고 이용했던 일본군 위안소와는 차이가 있다.

오히려 이것은 홋카이도나 사할린 지역에 강제 연행한 조선인 노동자와 일본인 노동자들을 상대로 회사에서 마련한 위안시설에서 일한 '산업위안부'제도와 닮은꼴이다. 일본이 저지른 대표적인 전쟁범죄인 종군위안부 문제에 가려 산업위안부 문제는 잘 드러나지 않았다.

그러나 일본 군수기업들은 노동자들에게 일종의 '성과급'으로 위안소를 이용할 수 있는 티켓을 제공하는 등 노동자를 통제하는 데 위안소 제도를 이용한 것으로 드러나고 있다. 결국 이런 사실들을 종합하면 한국전쟁 기간의 군 위안부 제도는 '일본군 종군위안부 제도의 잔재'라는 결론에 도달하게 된다.


"부끄러운 일본군 위안부 제도의 잔재"

그 때문인지 회고록에 군 위안부 제도를 기록한 장군들은 하나같이 위안소 운영의 타당성에 대한 의문과 함께 전쟁의 아픔, 그리고 절대빈곤의 참상을 지적한다.




▲ 한국전쟁 당시 연대장으로 복무한 채명신 장군(주월 한국군사령관)은 "군 위안부 제도는 장병들의 사기 진작과 성병 예방을 위해 도입한 '군부의 치부'이지만 당시 사회에 만연한 사창(私娼)을 군에 흡수해 인권을 보호한 측면도 있다"고 주장했다. 채명신 장군은 자신이 회고록에 기록한 한국전쟁 당시 겪은 군 위안부 제도에 대해 "드러내고 싶지 않은 군부의 치부이지만 움직일 수 없는 사실을 기록한 것"이라고 말했다. 그러면서도 채장군은 당시의 암울한 현실과 시대상황을 예로 들어 불가피성을 역설했다.

"당시는 전쟁이 장기화함에 따라 많은 젊은 여자들이 생계를 위해 미군 부대에서 몸을 팔고 전선 근처에까지 밀려드는 시절이었다. 당연히 사창에는 성병이 만연했고 사창을 방치할 경우 성병으로 인한 전투력 손실도 우려되었다. 따라서 군에서 장병들의 사기 진작과 전투력 손실 예방을 위해서 위안대를 편성해 군의관의 성병검진을 거쳐 장병들이 이용케 한 것이다. 그러나 어찌 보면 (창녀들을 군의 위안대에 흡수함으로써) 당시 사회의 필요악으로서 인권 사각지대에 방치된 많은 사창가 여자들의 인권을 보호한 측면도 있다."

그러나 당시 연대장이었던 채장군은 군 위안부 제도를 기획한 군 수뇌부의 주체가 누구인지에 대해서는 "잘 모르겠다"고 답했다. 또 채장군은 위안대의 규모에 대해서도 "명칭 상으로는 부대(특수위안대)이지만 부대 편제표에 의해 편성된 것이 아니기 때문에 위안부나 사창의 사정(수요공급)에 따라 위안대 규모가 그때그때 달라 정확한 인원을 산출하기가 어려웠을 것이다"고 지적했다.

"소대장님 티킷 한 장 더 얻을 수 없나요?" ....우리 5연대에서는 '위안부대'를 이용하는 데 몇 가지 규칙을 만들었다. 위안부대 출입은 티킷제로 운용토록 하였다. 그런데 아무에게나 티킷이 주어지는 건 아니다. 전쟁터에서 용감하게 싸워 공을 세운 순서대로 나눠준다. 물론 훈장을 받았다면 당연히 우선권이 있어 부러움의 대상이다.

"5연대는 무조건 계급에 관계없이 훈장을 많이 탄 사람부터 순서대로 위안부를 상대할 수 있다."

내가 이런 규칙을 만들자 부대 내에선 한바탕 입씨름이 벌어졌다.

"이제 너희는 모두 내 동생이다. 알았나?"

"잠시만 기다려라. 곧 내가 너희들에게 등정기를 발표할테니…. 기대하시라."

모든 입과 귀가 위안부대로 쏠려 있었다. 용감한 박판도 중사도 규정대로 두 장의 티킷을 받게 되었고, 첫 번째로 위안소에 가게 되었다.

난 당시 연대장이었으니 이 얘긴 후일 대대장을 통해 전해 들었다. 그런데 박중사는 숫총각이라 위안부 상대하는 것을 완강히 거부했다 한다. 그리곤 티킷도 다른 전우에게 주려 하는 걸 규칙이라 안된다며, 분대원들이 억지로 떠메곤 위안부대의 천막 속에다 집어넣었다 한다.

모든 분대원들은 천막 안을 들여다보면서 역사적 사태(?)를 지켜보았는데, 아뿔싸 순진한 박판도 총각은 여자가 바지를 벗기려 하자 "싫다"며 도망가질 않나, 억지로 벗기곤 강행하려 하자 결사적으로 피하질 않나, 밖에서 지켜보는 분대원들에게 한바탕 웃음만 안겨주고 있었다.

그러나 워낙 좁은 곳이라 결국은 여자한테 붙잡혔는데 상대가 숫총각이란 걸 안 여자가 장난삼아 그의 물건을 만지면서 "애걔, 요만한 걸 가지고 왔어?"하며 놀리자, 끝끝내 그는 총(?) 한방 못쏴보고 얼굴만 빨개가지곤 도망쳐 나왔다는 거였다.

분대원들은 자신의 분대장에게 치욕의 여름(夏)을 남기지 않으려, 그날 밤 철저한 강의와 사례를 들려주어 결국 박판도 중사를 설득시켰다. 다음날 재시도 끝에 박판도 중사는 결국 성공한다.

그런데 문제는 다음부터다. 한번 위안부대를 다녀온 박중사가 완전히 맛을 들인 것이다.

"저…, 소대장님. 저…, 티킷 한 장 더 얻을 수 없나요?"

이 지경까지 되어 내게 보고가 올라오니 난 웃음을 터뜨리지 않을 수 없었다.

"허, 그놈 참. 그래 대대장이 알아서 두어 장 더 집어줘…. 하하하…."

그때부터 난 왠지 마음에 걸렸다. 순진한 녀석이 전투만 알다가 어느날 갑자기 인생의 어떤 새로운 면을 알게 되었다면….

<채명신 회고록 '사선을 넘고 넘어'> (267~269쪽에서 인용)

육군본부의 공식기록인 <후방전사>의 '특수위안대 실적통계표'(1952년)에 따르더라도 당시 위안대를 이용한 장병은 적게 잡아도 연간 20만명을 넘는다. 또 "위안대를 이용할 수 있는 예비대로 빠지기도 전부터 장병들의 화제는 모두 위안부대 건이었다"는 채장군의 증언에서 보듯, 당시 한국전쟁에 참전했던 모든 군인들은 군이 설치·운용한 '특수위안대'의 존재를 알고 있었다.

바로 그 '공공연한 비밀'이 50년만에 뒤늦게 불거진 것은, 이 드러내고 싶지 않은 군부의 치부가 일본군 위안부 제도의 찌꺼기이기 때문인지도 모른다.

물론 한국군 위안대는 동원방식이나 기간 그리고 규모 등에서 일본군 종군위안부 제도와 본질적인 차이점이 있다. 그러나 상당 부분 일본군 종군위안부 제도와 유사한 방식으로 운용된 것 또한 사실이다(아래 <표 3> 참조).




<표 3> 일본군·한국군 위안부 제도의 유사점과 차이점 우선 사기 앙양과 전투력 손실 예방을 내세운 설치 목적부터가 유사하다. 또 병사들이 군대천막 앞에서 줄을 서서 이용하고 군의관이 성병검진을 하는 이용·관리 풍경도 흡사하다. 또 일본군의 군표 대신에 티켓과 같은 대가가 지불된 거래형식으로 운용되기도 했다.

이는 목격자들의 증언으로도 뒷받침된다. 한국전쟁 당시 이 희한한 제도를 처음 겪은 김희오 장군은 처음 위안대를 목격한 순간에 직감적으로 "이는 과거 일본군 내 종군 경험이 있는 일부 간부들이 부하 사기앙양을 위한 발상에서 비롯된 것이구나"하는 생각이 들었다고 한다. 그래서 김장군은 34년간 군 생활에서 처음 본 공개적인 군 위안소 운영 사례에 대해 그 당위성을 떠나 영원히 찜찜한 기억으로 각인되어 있다고 기억한다.

이 '찜찜한 기억'은 바로 8·15 해방과 48년 정부 수립 이후 초기 국가 및 군부 형성에 깊은 영향을 준 친일파 청산문제와 맞닿아 있는 것이다. 이를테면 합참의장은 1대 이형근 의장부터 14대 노재현 의장까지, 육군 참모총장은 1대 이응준 총장부터 21대 이세호 총장에 이르기까지 일제 군경력자들이 독식했다는 점을 미루어볼 때, 한국전쟁 당시 위안부 문제는 미청산된 친일파 문제와 직결되어 있음을 직감할 수 있는 것이다.

김귀옥 박사는 "한국전쟁 군 위안부 문제는 일본군 위안부 제도의 불행한 자식이라고 할 수 있다"면서 "이 문제도 (일본군 위안부 문제처럼) 피해 여성과 사회 단체 그리고 학계가 연대하여 풀어내야 할 우리의 과거 청산 문제의 하나"임을 강조했다.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-popes-verdict-japans-comfort-women-11168

The Pope's Verdict on Japan's Comfort Women

"The Pope returned the Comfort Women discussion to where it belongs—which is to comfort the victims."
Mindy Kotler
August 31, 2014


Before his final mass in South Korea on August 18, Pope Francis met with seven elderly ladies who had been Comfort Women. As teenagers during World War II they were trafficked by Imperial Japan to be sex slaves. Military records on the operation of a comfort station show that the girls had to service not only soldiers and sailors, but also Japanese government and corporate officials.

The Pope bent down and clasped the frail hands of each woman. One offered him a butterfly pin, a symbol of their lost innocence, which the Pontiff immediately fastened to his vestments and wore throughout the service. Prior to the mass, he was handed a letter from the Dutch former Comfort Woman, Jan Ruff O’Herne, who at 92 could not travel from her home in Australia to meet him. She wanted him to know that before she was chosen by Japanese Army officers in her concentration camp on Java and raped in a Semarang military brothel, her dream was to become a nun.


The women received more than the Pope’s blessing. They received affirmation that their history was believed and their suffering real. Francis has championed the elimination of human trafficking and preached on the evils of sexual slavery. By a simple gesture, he included their experience with all victims caught up in sexual violence. He understands that rape is a weapon of subjugation and humiliation. Unlike Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, the Pontiff does not rationalize the Comfort Women experience with “the 20th century was a century where many human rights were violated.”

Equally important, Pope Francis has helped internationalize and humanize the issue. The Abe administration has framed the Comfort Women issue entirely as a history problem with South Korea. The truth is that women throughout the Indo-Pacific region were the victims of the Imperial Army and Navy. The stories the women tell from the Andaman Islands to New Guinea, by Dutch gentry to Taiwanese aboriginals are shockingly similar.

As contemporary research has shown, sexual violence in conflict affects whole communities and generations. Recently, a Dutch woman came forward describing how as a four-year-old she waited daily on the steps of St. Xavier Church in the concentration camp at Moentilan, Java for her mother. Only as an adult did she learn that her mother’s lifetime nightmares were from being repeatedly raped by Japanese officers who had made the Church their headquarters. The mother was one of many “uncounted” Comfort Women.

Francis tacitly confirmed that the issue is not one of politics or diplomacy, as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga repeats. But it is also not one of history as Suga and Abe want us to believe. Instead, it is a timeless humanitarian concern that can only be resolved through humanitarian action. The Pope returned the Comfort Women discussion to where it belongs—which is to comfort the victims.

But the Abe government has politicized the Comfort Women issue. The most unsettling omission in the Abe administration’s discourse on the Comfort Women is the failure to acknowledge the Batavia War Crimes trials. A 1947 Tribunal found a number of Japanese officers guilty of entering a civilian internment camp to forcibly select thirty-five girls and bring them in military vehicles to a military brothel in Semarang (Indonesia). The Batavia trial thus recognized the "forced prostitution" (to use the Dutch government's terminology) of women as a war crime.

Oddly, in 2013, there was a Cabinet Decision admitting that the trial documents were part of the official Japanese government records supporting the Kono Statement. These did not seem to have been considered in the recent government “review” of how the Statement was drafted. Instead, the Abe Government continues to parse the traumatic memories of Korean former Comfort Women and Japanese soldiers looking for discrepancies to question this sordid history.

The omission can lead to the disturbing conclusion that discrediting the Comfort Women, no matter the evidence, has a greater goal. This is to set aside any legal record or proceeding prosecuting Japan’s war criminals. The ease at which the Batavia trial verdict has been disregarded has implications for the verdicts of all the hundreds of war crimes trials throughout the Pacific after the war, especially the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

Undoing the postwar regime and its “masochistic” history is a stated objective of the Abe administration. The path to regaining Japanese pride and independence, according to Mr. Abe and many in his administration, means not accepting the results of the Tokyo Tribunal and not being a victim to its “victor’s justice.” By ignoring the Batavia verdicts, the Abe government takes the first step to challenge the decisions of The Tribunal.

Paying homage at Yasukuni, the spiritual symbol of Imperial Japan is a ritualistic swipe at the Tokyo Tribunal. Yasukuni, where hundreds of war criminals are deified, which hosts a museum that celebrates Japan’s “liberation” of Asia and small shrines to the likes of the Kempeitai, does not accept Japan’s defeat or the condemnation of its war criminals. Thus, a visit or an offering sent is less about mourning than about a gesture as powerful as the Pope’s in affirming a certain point of view as fact.


"The Pope returned the Comfort Women discussion to where it belongs—which is to comfort the victims."
Mindy Kotler
August 31, 2014

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In the end, it is not about the dead. As the Pope showed, it is the living that need peace. Maybe Abe should spend less time with the dead. At every international visit, the prime minister has made a point of visiting war memorials. On his recent trip to Papua New Guinea, Abe visited two memorials to Japan’s fallen at Wewak. He made no mention of how this horrific final campaign descended into barbarism and cannibalism. Nor was there mention of the thousands of POWs, mainly Indian and Australian, killed through starvation, overwork, disease or target-practice on the island.

At this year’s August 15th anniversary for Japan’s war dead, Abe, unlike past prime ministers, made no mention of apology for Japan’s aggression. Again, this is viewed as a rejection of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal’s judgments.


Central to Japan’s peace treaty with the Allied governments in 1951, was acceptance of the verdicts of the Tokyo Tribunal. Abe’s rallying the dead to abandon the Tribunal’s verdicts does not engender trust among Japan’s allies or foes. Thus, it is time for Prime Minister Abe to make an important gesture to reassure his critics. He can affirm that he has no plans to ignore or repudiate the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Saying that he, for now, inherits the Murayama apology—he walked out of a parliamentary vote on this apology in 1995—is not enough. He needs to embrace these ideas.

Pope Francis’ quiet inclusion of the Comfort Women in his mass was a humanitarian gesture. It was an acceptance that no woman at any place or time should be subjected to the mercy of her captors. The political debate over Comfort Women to exonerate Imperial Japan’s war conduct has been damaging to modern Japan’s international image. Prime Minister Abe is best advised to affirm the verdicts of history and offer an unequivocal humanitarian response to the surviving Comfort Women in Korea and in other places.

Mindy Kotler is the director of Asia Policy Point.

Image: Flickr/Official Republic of Korea/CC by-sa 2.0

http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001750552
Apology for inappropriate expressions used in comfort women articles
Clip to Evernote
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12:00 am, December 16, 2014
The Japan News
An in-house review has found that The Daily Yomiuri (hereafter referred to as the DY, and now The Japan News) used “sex slave” and other inappropriate expressions in a total of 97 articles from February 1992 to January 2013 in its reporting on the issue of so-called comfort women.

The Japan News apologizes for having used these misleading expressions and will add a note stating that they were inappropriate to all the articles in question in our database. We also have a list of the articles on our website (the-japan-news.com).

The Yomiuri Shimbun (Japanese edition) likewise expressed an apology in its Friday edition.

Among articles related to the comfort women issue — those translated from Yomiuri Shimbun stories and DY original stories — there are 85 articles in which “sex slave” and other words with the same meaning were used in an inappropriate manner.

The expression “comfort women” was difficult to understand for non-Japanese who did not have knowledge of the subject. Therefore the DY, based on an inaccurate perception and using foreign news agencies’ reports as reference, added such explanations as “women who were forced into sexual slavery” that did not appear in The Yomiuri Shimbun’s original stories.

For example, the Henshu Techo front page column carried in The Yomiuri Shimbun’s edition for Aug. 30, 1997, contained the words “about descriptions of comfort women and others.” However, “Jottings,” the DY’s translated version of the column, said, “the issue of ‘comfort women,’ who were forced into sexual servitude by the Imperial Japanese Army.”

There were also 12 articles that did not use “sex slave” or other words with that meaning, but defined comfort women in such terms as “forced into prostitution by the military,” as if coercion by the Japanese government or the army was an objective fact.

A statement on comfort women issued in 1993 by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono stated that “.... at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments [of comfort women].” The meaning was accurately presented by the DY initially.

However, the DY later simplified the meaning of the statement into, for example, “The government admitted that the Imperial Japanese Army forcibly recruited women” and used misleading expressions in some cases.

* * *
The following is the list of the DY articles which contain inappropriate expressions (The headlines with the date of publication in the parentheses):

•1992
S. Korea Rejects North’s Proposal For Compensation (Feb. 21): Political Pulse (May 11): Korea Probing ‘Comfort Women’ (July 4): 42 Taiwanese Said Served As ‘Comfort Women’ (July 11): Editorial / Need To Resolve A Discomforting Issue (July 14): Sex Slavery Issue Not Settled Yet (Sept. 8): Ramos Defends Rights Record During Years Under Marcos (Sept. 27): Turning Point For Japan-China Relations (Sept. 30): Kim Lists Japan First On Overseas Visit If Elected (Sept. 30): Govt, Red Cross Mull ‘Comfort Women’ Pact (Oct. 10): ‘Comfort Women’ Move Shelved (Nov. 18): International Hearing Set On ‘Comfort Women’ Issue (Nov. 26): In music, films, and on stage, cultural happenings (Dec. 26): Editorial / Scandal Battered Hopes In ’92 (Dec. 31)
•1993
18 ‘comfort women’ file suit (April 3): High school teachers wrestle with ‘comfort women’ issue (July 21): Japan to admit ’comfort women’ forced to serve (July 24): Miyazawa making bid to deal with old issues (July 25): SDPJ moves to become ‘realistic’ (Aug. 26): ROK’s Hann to visit Japan (Aug. 30): ‘Comfort women’ settlement sought (Aug. 31): Yamahana sets new path in Seoul (Sept. 8): Comfort women names found on POW list (Oct. 9): Editorial / Hopes for Japan-South Korea summit (Nov. 6): A painful tale about ‘comfort’ women (Nov. 20)
•1994
South Koreans protest occupation (March 3): Kim advocates new bilateral partnership in Asia-Pacific age (March 26): Measures planned for comfort women (July 7): Fund plans discussed (Aug. 25): Forging future of Asia/ Murayama finds past not main issue (Aug. 31): 100 billion yen plan unveiled to cover war reparations (Sept. 1): East Asian Women’s Forum set for Tokyo (Sept. 8): Igarashi gets warm response to ‘comfort women’ fund plan (Oct. 31): Coalition panel urges ‘private’ fund to help comfort women (Dec. 7): Funds for students, sex slaves (Dec. 21)
•1995
‘Comfort women’ pledge to fight Tokyo (March 1): Cold comfort for war sex slaves (March 13): ‘Comfort women’ fund to be set up in May (April 8): Confab urges ‘comfort women’ probe (April 9): U.S. lawyer blasts foes of war resolution (May 31): Asians say resolution insufficient (June 8): Philippine ‘sex slaves’ reject apology (June 14): Seminar raps govt on ‘comfort women’ issue (July 5): Koreans plan ‘comfort women’ dance (July 12): U.N. investigator to visit Japan (July 14): U.N. ‘comfort women’ team arrives (July 23): ‘Comfort women fund’ explained (July 25): 15 Chinese file suits against govt (Aug. 8): ‘Comfort women’ reflect Japan values (Aug. 15): Murmurs of despair (Oct.12)
•1996
Premier to donate for ‘comfort women’ (Feb. 24): ‘Comfort women’ fund to start payout in July (April 8): Words in the News/ comfort women (April 18): ‘Comfort women’ fund-raiser to quit (May 4): Media reports show insensitivity to legal issues (May 29): Words in the News / apology (June 13): Taiwan women urge Toyota boycott (June 16): ‘Comfort women’ OK’d in textbooks (June 28): French priest wins environment award (July 6): 800 mil. yen eyed for ex-comfort women (July 10): Ex-comfort woman steadfast in demand for govt apology (July 12): Former ‘comfort woman’ testifies in court (July 20): Sex slave letter to cite responsibility (July 28): 3 former ‘comfort women’ receive Hashimoto apology (Aug. 15): Modern history has been neglected for too long (Aug. 19): Words in the News / Postwar settlement (Aug. 29): Straight talk on tangled ties (Oct. 2): ‘Comfort women’ hunger strike held (Nov. 26)
•1997
South Korea calls on Japan to settle ‘comfort women’ issue (Jan. 14): 7 Philippine ex-sex slaves to get aid (Jan. 16): Compensation suspended for ex-sex slaves in ROK (Jan. 17): Hashimoto, Kim to avoid thorny issues (Jan. 25): Hashimoto, Kim discuss closer ties (Jan. 26): Kajiyama expresses regret over remarks (Jan. 28): Editorial / Protect right of freedom of speech (Jan. 31): Film on WWII ‘comfort women’ to explain restitution plan (March 19): Editorial / Speech restricted in postwar Japan (March 30): S. Korean foreign minister to visit (April 10): Education Ministry rejects 4 ‘defective’ texts (June 28): ‘Comfort women’ fund still drawing criticism (July 21): Jottings (Aug. 31): Reconciling Japan’s past and future (Sept. 24)
•1998
‘Comfort women’ fund may change aid strategy (July 7): Nakagawa stirs controversy over ‘comfort women’ textbook description (Aug. 1)
•2000
Mock court to rule on WWII sex slave system (Dec. 4)
•2001
High court reverses ruling favoring ‘comfort women’ (March 30): Textbook issue will drag on, activist warns (June 6): U.S. hubris makes a comeback (July 22): Women struggling in a new ARENA (Nov. 24)
•2004
Former NHK documentarian focuses on the controversial (Jan. 31)
•2005
LDP ‘made’ NHK edit emperor, sex slave story (Jan. 14): NHK oversight panel reprimanded executives (Jan. 16): Televiews / New 2005 TV drama gets serious (Jan. 20)
•2006
Abe clarifies views on ‘history issue,’ reaffirms government apologies (Oct. 7): Bullying, school subjects to top committee agenda (Oct. 30)
•2010
Editorial / Kan statement a fillip for Japan-S. Korea ties (Aug. 12)
•2013
Abe diplomacy starts with Southeast Asia (Jan. 15)





http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/japan-denied-revision-of-un-comfort-women-report/

Japan Denied Revision of UN Comfort Women Report
The Japanese government’s request to amend a 1996 U.N. special rapporteur’s report on comfort women was denied.

ankit-panda
By Ankit Panda
October 17, 2014


According to a statement by government spokesman Yoshihide Suga on Thursday, the Japanese government asked the United Nations to partially retract an old United Nations report detailing abuses against Korean and other women who were forced to work as “comfort women” during the Second World War. The government’s request was rejected by the report’s author. The revelation comes amid a broader trend in Japan where conservative politicians have challenged the veracity of international claims regarding how the Imperial Japanese Army treated women in Korea and elsewhere during the war. Suga did not specify what sections of the report were in question.

The report, authored by former U.N. special rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy in 1996, called on Japan to apologize to the victims and pay reparations to survivors who had been forced into sex slavery during the war. The report was authored after Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono issued a statement in 1993 sharing the conclusions of a Japanese government study that declared that the Imperial Japanese Army was culpable of forcing women — mostly Koreans and Chinese — into sexual slavery. Kono’s statement included an apology and has been under criticism by some Japanese conservatives. For example, current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during his first term in 2007, stated that he did not believe that the women were necessarily forced into sexual slavery, sparking controversy at the time. Though Abe has recently been less willing to explicitly contradict the Kono statement, remarks from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party suggest that the Kono statement could be amended in the future. That his administration would now try to revise the U.N. special rapporteurs’ report is evidence that Abe’s government is likely pandering to a small but considerably influential conservative political base in Japan.

South Korea condemned the Japanese government’s attempt to revise the report. Noh Kwang-il, spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry, remarked, “However hard the Japanese government tries to distort the true nature of the comfort women issue and play down or hide the past wrongdoings, it will never be able to whitewash history.” The domestic debate on the issue in Japan was transformed this summer when the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, a left-leaning publication, issued a retraction of several articles it had published on the issue of sex slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army that were based on a discredited source. Japanese conservatives took this to vindicate their apprehension about the international consensus on the issue. Despite the Asahi Shimbun‘s retraction, the testimonies of numerous survivors of sexual slavery under the Imperial Japanese Army — particularly South Korean survivors — continue to resonate in the region.

Historical issues are a particular inhibitor to closer ties between Northeast Asian states. In particular, relations between South Korea and Japan have been chilly ever since Shinzo Abe returned to power in December 2012. South Korea continues to demand that Japan resolve the “comfort women” issue ”effectively and in a way that is agreeable to the living victims.” Issues like historical revisionism on the comfort women issue are non-negotiable for the South Korean government. Beyond the government, public opinion of Japan, particularly the government under Abe, is at historic lows in South Korea.

正月花

http://www.dibrary.net/jsp/download.jsp?file_id=FILE-00000601359

http://members.jcom.home.ne.jp/kadougijyuku/tenji/tenji2003_01.htm

オモト(万年青、Rohdea japonica)
伝花　　万年青（おもと）

陰の実にして至って祝儀にすべき物なり
立葉、露受葉、ながし葉、前葉なり
右の外の葉はあしらいなり
花器は背高くうるはしき不好（このまず）
背ひきくわびしき物よし
仮にも掛に生べからず

the traditional flower

it is the best of the celebration article, because of for the flower of the shadow berry (yin),
the contexture is from the leaves of standing,dew,receiving,sinking,front.
the leaf of right of the out side is for garnish.
its not good to use the high vase,
its good to use the low and wintry vase.
don't rest it against on the wall.

http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/lehigh-county/index.ssf/2015/01/lehigh_county_massage_parlors.html

Lehigh County massage parlor's neighbors suspected prostitution, glad to see Aries Spa closed
Aries Spa
Police say Aries Spa in Lehigh County was a prostitution front. (Precious Petty | lehighvalleylive.com)
Print Precious Petty | The Express-Times By Precious Petty | The Express-Times
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on January 12, 2015 at 6:00 PM, updated January 12, 2015 at 6:35 PM



The Lehigh County business authorities say was a front for prostitution has been a source of complaints for years, according to court records.

South Whitehall Township police have been receiving complaints about Aries Spa, 3333 Hamilton Blvd., since 2008. There were complaints about male customers entering and exiting through the business' rear door and suspected sexual activity inside the spa, as well as concerns that employees were living there, records say.

Carol Greenwalt owns Dorneyville Beverage, which is just a few doors down from Aries Spa. She's among those who lodged complaints about the business.

"I'm glad it finally happened," Greenwalt said of the spa's closure "We would call and make complaints to South Whitehall Township ... since the day it opened."

Other Dorneyville Shopping Center business owners have long suspected illegal activity at Aries Spa, Greenwalt said. "I'm glad it's gone because it hurt our business," she said. "People didn't want to come here because they know what was going on."

Police have conducted periodic surveillance at the massage parlor, but were unable to establish probable cause and secure a search warrant until last week, according to the county district attorney's office.

Township police and the Lehigh County Drug Task Force on Thursday afternoon executed a search warrant at the spa and arrested five women accused of trading sexual favors for cash, as well as a sixth woman accused of managing the establishment.

New York residents Jinyu Yu Yang, 43; Xian Shun Zi, 37; Gui Yue Xu, 51; Kim Young Soon, 55; and Sun Mi Lee, 36, are each charged with a single misdemeanor count of prostitution. They were arraigned before District Judge Wayne Maura and sent to county jail in lieu of $10,000 bail each.

Pun Son Hutcheson, a 61-year-old Connecticut resident, is charged with a single felony count of promoting prostitution. She's in jail in lieu of $25,000 bail.

Authorities seized $12,000 cash, condoms, a laptop, a tablet, cellphones and paperwork during their search of the spa. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security assisted with the investigation of Aries Spa.

County drug task force Detective Chad Moyer in November 2008 followed up on the complaints, conducted surveillance and made contact with an Aries Spa customer, records say. The customer told the detective he'd paid $200 for an hour-long massage and at its conclusion the masseuse had performed a sex act on him, records say.

The building's owner, Haresh Joshi, in November relayed his suspicions about prostitution at Aries Spa to police, telling them he'd asked employees to stop letting customers access the rear door, records say. He also told authorities other businesses in the shopping center had complained about the establishment.

Joshi told police he hired a private investigator who in September visited the spa, paid $70 for a 50-minute massage that concluded with a "happy ending," or a sex act, records say. The investigator afterward tipped the masseuse.

A second investigator hired by Joshi visited the spa later that month and had a similar experience, however, the masseuse had sex with him in addition to performing a sex act, records say. The investigators supplied Joshi with a notarized affidavit recounting their visits to the spa.

Authorities in October conducted surveillance at Aries Spa and saw a number of men enter the business and exit after spending about an hour inside, records say. Investigators subsequently found the spa listed on websites such as spa hunters.com and rubmaps.com.

In the following months, authorities pulled over men as they left the spa and some of them helped police identify Aries Spa employees who'd traded sexual favors for cash, records say. The men were not charged.





http://www.wfmz.com/news/news-regional-lehighvalley/six-women-arrested-for-prostitution-at-aries-spa/30618914?item=0


Six women arrested for prostitution at Aries Spa Establishment operated in Dorneyville Shopping Center in South Whitehall
Author: 69 News , follow: @69news, news@wfmz.com
Published: Jan 09 2015 06:19:46 PM EST Updated On: Jan 11 2015 07:20:02 AM EST Share on 


Six women arrested for prostitution at Aries Spa
SOUTH WHITEHALL TOWNSHIP, Pa.

- Six women have been arrested on prostitution charges in South Whitehall Township. The prostitution occurred inside Aries Spa in the Dorneyville Shopping Center at 3333 Hamilton Blvd. in the township, according to police. Male customers who went to Aries Spa for massages were offered "happy endings" -- masturbation, oral sex or intercourse for additional fees, according to police.

Quick Clicks Phantoms fall at Hershey in Akeson's return Amanda's wet,slick,cold Forecast Roads improving after Sunday morning flash freeze Bellante Properties will pay $19,120 to resolve allegations Emmaus Council approves buying Rodale building for $2.95 million South Whitehall police, the FBI and the Lehigh County Drug Task Force entered the business with a search warrant at 1:17 p.m. Thursday.

Arrested were 55-year-old Kim Young Soon, also known as Penny; 51-year-old Xu Gui Yue, aka Mya; 42-year-old Jinyu Yang, aka Candy; 35-year-old Sun Mi Lee, aka GeGe, and 36-year-old Xian Shun Zi, aka Sara. All five gave police home addresses in Flushing, Queens, N.Y. All five face prostitution charges that are misdemeanors of the third degree. Two men stopped by police after leaving the business on Wednesday identified Shun Zi as the woman who had performed sex acts on them that day. Pun Son Hutcheson, 61, of Vernon, Conn., was charged with promoting prostitution, a felony.

One of the men stopped by police Wednesday said Hutcheson brought three women to the front for him to choose from. Hutcheson told police she only did laundry, cleaning and cooking. She denied any knowledge of condoms being used or even in the business. But police found a stash of of condoms hidden in the kitchen and laundry room area where Hutcheson said she worked. Law enforcement personnel seized $12,000 in cash, condoms, documents, cell phones, a tablet and a lap top at the spa. South Whitehall police received complaints about possible sexual activity at the spa as far back as 2008, including many male patrons entering and exiting the rear of the building. There also were concerns about female employees living in the establishment. Some men still were trying to get into the place on Friday.

"They were disappointed, I guess," said Mario Scotto, who owns a pizza shop next to Aries. He said one man asked him why the door was locked. He told him the place was shut down because "they got caught" and added: "The party is over." Scotto is surprised it took police so long to close the place, because what was going on there was obvious.
 "After awhile, people knew what is was."
He's glad it's been closed because it was not good for his business.
"Being here in a shopping center like this is not good."
"I just thought this is so creepy in a family-oriented strip mall," said JoAnn Basist of South Whitehall.
She said she became outraged and called police after she did an Internet search of Aries Spa and "very easily" found out what was going on inside. The Lehigh County Drug Task Force also began investigating Aries Spa in late 2008, according to court documents. Police conducted periodic surveillance of the business between 2008 and 2014 but were unable to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant, explained Lehigh County District Attorney James Martin in a news release.

Last fall, police received additional information and were able to cultivate confidential informants who provided sufficient evidence to obtain a search warrant, reported the district attorney. In October, police put the business under surveillance and located customer "testimonials" on Internet sites about sexual favors they received at Aries Spa in exchange for tips. In November, the building's owner, Haresh Joshi, complained to police about sexual activity inside the business. He said he stopped patrons from using the rear entrance.

 Joshi told police he had received complaints about Aries Spa from several other businesses in the shopping center. Joshi said he had hired private investigators who paid $70 for massages lasting about 50 minutes. Those private investigators then received "happy endings" -- sex acts at the conclusion of their massages -- from the female employees. They gave those employees tips.

On Nov. 10, police stopped a man who has just left Aries Spa. He admitted that he also paid $70 to the lady in charge when he entered the place and an additional $50 for oral sex from a female employee he indentified as Bebe. On Wednesday, police stopped two more males who were driving away from Aries Spa. Both also said they paid $70 at the door for massages.

One man had a female employee perform masturbation on him for an additional $30. The other man paid an additional $130 for sexual intercourse with a female employee.
Quick Clicks Phantoms fall at Hershey in Akeson's return Amanda's wet,slick,cold Forecast Roads improving after Sunday morning flash freeze Bellante Properties will pay $19,120 to resolve allegations Emmaus Council approves buying Rodale building for $2.95 million A preliminary hearing on the charges against Yue, Yang and Shun Zi is scheduled for 1:30 p.m. Jan.

16 in Magisterial District Court 31-0-01 in the Lehigh County Courthouse in Allentown. A preliminary hearing on the charges against Hutcheson, Lee and Soon is scheduled for 1:45 p.m. Jan. 16 in the same court.

The FBI and Department of Homeland Security assisted in the Aries Spa investigation. Copyright 2015 WFMZ. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.




http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-c-south-whitehall-aries-spa-massage-parlor-prostitution-sting-20150109-story.html

A middle-aged man walked past the pizza shop at a South Whitehall strip mall Friday morning, his head down as he made a beeline for Aries Spa.

The man tugged at the door a few times, but it was locked.

"It's closed, buddy," Mario Scotto, owner of Mario's Pizza Cafe, told the man. "They're not coming back."

After several years of complaints to township officials, police and their landlord, Scotto and other business owners at the Dorneyville Shopping Center on Hamilton Boulevard say they've finally got what they wanted.

On Thursday afternoon, Lehigh County Drug Task Force detectives, South Whitehall police and the FBI shut down Aries Spa, arresting six women on prostitution charges, according to court records. Detectives seized $12,000, condoms, various documents and electronics.

Nearby storeowner reacts to South Whitehall massage parlor bust
This is Carol Greenwalt. She owns Dorneyville Beverage, located a few doors away from Aries Spa, which was busted on Thursday as a front for prostitution.
The women, ranging in age from 36 to 61, are from New York and Connecticut.

The sting at Aries Spa was long overdue, according to business owners at the shopping center.

"Finally," said Carol Greenwalt, owner of Dorneyville Beverage. "It's about time. It only took three years."

Actually, according to court records, the first complaints were registered in 2008, shortly after the spa opened at 3333 Hamilton Blvd.

According to a criminal complaint:

South Whitehall police received several complaints about possible prostitution from 2008 to 2014. A Lehigh County detective acted on the complaints, staking out the spa on Nov. 7, 2008, and stopping a man who walked out.

The man told the detective he just paid $200 for an hour for a massage from a female masseuse. When the massage was finished, the masseuse flipped him over, undressed and performed a sex act on him, the man said.

Court records do not say why no one was charged at the time. Lehigh County District Attorney Jim Martin said Friday that police conducted periodic surveillance of the business between 2008 and 2014, but were unable to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Late last year, strip mall owner Haresh Joshi contacted police to tell them he still suspected prostitution going on at the spa. Joshi said business owners at the strip mall repeatedly complained to him about the spa and about the men coming and going at the rear of the building.

Because of the complaints, Joshi said he stopped letting the spa use the rear entrance and also hired a private investigator.

Mario's Pizza Cafe owner talks about bust at Aries spa
This is Mario Scotto, owner of Mario's Pizza Cafe in the Dorneyville Shopping Center. He reacts to a sting at a massage parlor next to his pizzeria.
Joshi's investigator went to the spa on Sept. 12, paid $70 when he entered the spa and got a 50-minute massage followed by a "happy ending," a sex act. The private investigator left a tip for the masseuse, then returned two days later with the same results.

Lehigh County detectives conducted surveillance on the spa for five hours on Oct. 6, watching nine men enter and exit the building. Each man spent about an hour in the spa.

The detectives searched the business on the Internet, finding adult websites that gave descriptions from customers about sex they received.

The detectives conducted more days of surveillance at the spa, again seeing men come and go at all hours. Police stopped a man leaving the business on Nov. 10 and asked him what happened inside. The man said he paid a woman $70 as soon as he entered, then got a massage and oral sex from a masseuse named Bebe. He left her a $50 tip.

cComments
A business has a right to complain about these spas. These mongers are sketchy looking men. Spahunter.com is whining about not getting the chance to pay for sexton now. Eccie.net is another site that puts out a lot of information on what your neighbor is doing when they get 50 guys in for...
JJWALKER
AT 7:32 PM JANUARY 10, 2015
ADD A COMMENTSEE ALL COMMENTS
11
Police conducted a traffic stop on Wednesday afternoon, questioning a male driver leaving the spa about his visit. The man told police he paid the $70 entrance fee, followed by a massage and oral sex. The man gave the masseuse, a woman named Candy, an $80 tip.

Another man was stopped at 12:58 p.m. Thursday and gave the same story. Minutes after that stop, detectives and police moved in, searched the spa and arrested several women.

Several other men were stopped and questioned Wednesday and Thursday.

Those charged are Flushing, Queens, residents Jin Yu Yang, 43, also known as Candy; Sun Mi Lee, 36, also known as GeGe; Guie Yue Xu, 51, also known as Mya; Xian Sun Zi, 37, also known as Sara; Kim Young Soon, 55, also known as Penny. Pun Son Hutcheson, 61, from Vernon, Conn., was identified as the spa manager.

All the women face prostitution charges. They were arraigned Friday by District Judge Wayne Maura and sent to Lehigh County Jail. Hutcheson was sent to jail on $25,000 bail and the others on $10,000 bail.

The men have not been charged.

Scotto said police took several women out of the back of the building and Hutcheson out the front. He said it felt good to finally see the place raided.

"This is a family place," he said. "We have lots of kids coming here."

Just the sign "AIRES" identifies the business.

"There's nothing on the front windows, the shades are all the way down and as soon as you walked in, there were partitions so you couldn't see anything further than the partition," Greenwalt said.

The front of the spa is a waiting room where a customer would ring a door bell to get buzzed in by someone monitoring a surveillance camera.

Spa customers would park as far away as possible, then walk straight to the spa, trying to avoid being detected, Greenwalt said. Some would park on the other side of Hamilton Boulevard and dash across the busy road. Until a few months ago, they mostly entered through the back.

According to adult Web forums that specialize in the underground world of erotic massage parlors, Aries Spa is one of the most reviewed and highest-rated locations in the area. Besides talking up experiences at the spa, people commented on prices and ways to avoid being detected during visits.

One wrote, "I recommend parking closer to the Chicken Lounge. You get weird looks walking past the pizza place next door."

Greenwalt and Scotto said they both feel business at the shopping center took a hit because of the spa.

"They would have more customers than I did," Scotto said.

Scotto said he's hopeful things will go back to the way things were before the spa moved in next door. Before Aries Spa bought the building, it was home to a nonprofit group that provided care for young pregnant women.

"I feel pretty good about it. I'm happy they're gone."

manuel.gamiz@mcall.com

610-820-6595



http://www.koreadaily.com/news/read.asp?art_id=3104663

1 名前：HONEY MILKφ ★＠転載は禁止[] 投稿日：2015/01/19(月) 12:16:16.71 ID:???
ニューヨーク出身の韓人（コリアン）の女3人が、ペンシルベニア州で売春の容疑で逮捕された。

ペンシルベニア州リーハイ郡検察は去る8日、サウスホワイトホールタウンシップ地域のハミルトン大通りショッピングセンターの某スパで、キム・ヨンスン（55歳）、ヤン・ジンユ（43歳）、イ・ソンミ（36歳）など3人の韓人の女3と、中国系の女2人を売春の容疑で検挙したと13日に明らかにした。また、売春を斡旋した60代の女も
同時に逮捕した。

検察によれば、今までこのスパには売春の申告が相次いでいたが、容疑を掴む事ができなかった。

しかし最近になって申告がまた受け付けられ、地域の警察と連邦捜査局（FBI）、連邦国土安全保障局（HSI） などが合同捜査を行った事が分かった。

ソース：米州中央日報（韓国語）
http://www.koreadaily.com/news/read.asp?art_id=3104663


홈 > 뉴스 > 사회/정치 > 일반 기사목록| 글자크기
뉴욕 한인 여성 3명, 원정 성매매로 체포
댓글 5 [LA중앙일보] 발행 2015/01/14 미주판 6면 기사입력 2015/01/13 21:01
메이드 인 USA 베스트 10 모델은?


스크랩
뉴욕 출신 한인 여성 3명이 펜실베니아주에서 성매매 혐의로 체포됐다.

펜실베니아주 리하이 카운티 검찰은 지난 8일 사우스 화이트홀 타운십 지역 해밀턴 불러바드 쇼핑센터의 한 스파에서 김영순(55), 양진유(43), 이선미(36)씨 등 한인 여성 3명과 중국계 여성 2명을 성매매 혐의로 검거했다고 13일 밝혔다. 또 성매매를 알선한 60대 여성도 함께 체포됐다.

검찰에 따르면 그동안 이 스파에는 성매매 신고가 잇따랐으나 혐의를 잡지 못했다.

하지만 최근 신고가 또 접수돼 지역 경찰과 연방수사국(FBI), 연방국토안보국(HSI) 등이 합동수사를 벌였던 것으로 전해졌다.

오세진 기자

http://www.ktul.com/story/22211091/birmingham-police-arrest-4-more-women-for-prostitution-at-roebuck-spa


Birmingham police make prostitution bust at Roebuck spa for second time in three weeks
Posted: May 10, 2013 7:11 AM
Updated: May 10, 2013 3:46 PM
By Ben CulpepperCONNECT

Top (l-r): Eun Hug Heo, 38, Kyoung Hee Yoo, 34; Bottom (l-r): Chong Ok LeBlanc, 59, and Xingyue Xu, 36.
Top (l-r): Eun Hug Heo, 38, Kyoung Hee Yoo, 34; Bottom (l-r): Chong Ok LeBlanc, 59, and Xingyue Xu, 36.
Less than three weeks after five suspects were arrested in a prostitution bust at a spa in Roebuck, Birmingham police have arrested four women at the same location in another vice operation.

Eun Hug Heo, 38, Kyoung Hee Yoo, 34, Xingyue Xu, 36 and Chong Ok LeBlanc, 59, were arrested Wednesday at Bali Spa located at 9533 Parkway East by vice detectives with the Birmingham Police Department.

LeBlanc was charged with operating a house of prostitution, Yoo and Xu were charged with residing in a house of prostitution and Heo was charged with soliciting prostitution. The suspects have addresses from various states.

Police raided the spa 19 days ago and arrested four women and a man on charges of loitering for prostitution and drugs as well as operating a house of prostitution.



Five arrested at Bali Spa on April 19: Top (l-r): Soon Ae Carado, Mi Young Knichel; Center: Joshua Palmer; Bottom (l-r): Buy Park, Soon Lim.




http://www.wptv.com/news/region-s-palm-beach-county/boca-raton/oasian-wellness-and-spa-in-boca-raton-used-for-prostitution-police-say


O'Asian Wellness and Spa in Boca Raton used for prostitution, police say
Three women arrested

John Sparks
3:02 PM, Jun 10, 2014

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Video for mobile: http://bit.ly/1jiC566

A Boca Raton spa was a front for prostitution, according to an affidavit filed in Palm Beach County court.

According to the document, police first received a tip about O'Asian Wellness and Spa on January 1, 2012.

The anonymous complaint accused the spa at 2499 Glades Road, Suite 113, of being a massage parlor with an all-male customer base.

Between June 5, 2013 and May 20, 2014 police say they stopped and interviewed 12 male customers and all but one admitted they either engaged in a sex act with a female employee or were solicited by an employee for a sexual act.

The average massage cost about $70 per hour or $50 per half hour, not including a tip, police noted.

Investigators identified 50-year-old Xiaoqin Li of Sunny Isles Beach as the owner. They have charged her with money laundering, deriving support from the proceeds of prostitution, maintaining a house of prostitution and an offer to commit prostitution.

In addition, police arrested 40-year-old Yan Lin and 54-year-old Exian Zheng. Both were charged with prostitution.

Copyright 2014 Scripps Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.



http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/police-woman-ran-prostitution-operation-out-of-boc/ngHxf/

Police: Woman ran prostitution operation out of Boca spa
11:08 a.m. Tuesday, June 10, 2014 | Filed in: Crime


The O’Asian Wellness and Spa across from the mall at Town Center in Boca Raton was a thinly disguised but sophisticated house of prostitution that pulled down more than $10,000 a month by charging its exclusively male clientele for “happy endings” and more in its massage rooms, investigators say.

Last week, Boca Raton police arrested Xiaoqin Li, 50 for her role allegedly running the illegal business.

Police: Woman ran prostitution operation out of Boca spa photo
Xiaoqin Li
She remained in jail Tuesday, held without bond and facing charges that include money laundering, running a house of prostitution and living off the earnings of those acts.

An anonymous tip to the Boca Raton police department more than two years ago sparked the investigation that tracked the business through state records, examined the owner’s bank accounts and even rooted through reviews of the spa’s ‘services’ online.

At some point, investigators also conducted traffic stops of a dozen of the spa’s apparent clients to determine what services they got and how much they paid for them. They also got permission to plant video surveillance inside the business.

The spa advertised on backpage.com and its services were reviewed by paying members of Rubmaps.com, where members rate their experiences at local massage parlors, according to Li’s arrest report.

Investigators say those reviews detailed the sex acts that the women at the spa “performed or would allow” — the reviews also described the women including their height, weight, ethnicity and breast size. According to the investigator’s report, “O’Asian Wellness Spa has its own page with multiple postings.”

The arrest report said clients were charged an entrance fee — typically $70 for an hour. The client then tipped $15 to $50 for “depending on their experience.” Most paid cash, the report said.

At one point, health department officials paid a visit to the spa and suspected the female employees were living in rooms on the business’ second floor.

Li reported business earnings to the state of about $917 a month; her bank accounts reflected income closer to $11,200 a month. And the investigator said he believed “there is a significant amount of cash being generated by the business which Li is not depositing into any bank account(s) which she has at her disposal.”

Li’s home address is listed in Sunny Isles Beach in Miami-Dade County. Two women who investigators said were employed by Li were also arrested, but have posted bonds to be released from jail.




http://www.wnem.com/story/25889831/seven-arrests-made-in-prostitution-sting

Seven arrests made in joint prostitution sting

Posted: Jun 28, 2014 3:40 AM
Updated: Jul 26, 2014 3:47 AM
By Dal KalsiCONNECT


Top (left to right): Donna Lee, Kyong Suk Woo, So Yeon Kim, Jung Ja Kim. Bottom: Kyung Mi Haar, Sun Ah Cho, Chom Suk Brantley. (Courtesy: Anderson Co. Sheriff's Office)
Top (left to right): Donna Lee, Kyong Suk Woo, So Yeon Kim, Jung Ja Kim. Bottom: Kyung Mi Haar, Sun Ah Cho, Chom Suk Brantley. (Courtesy: Anderson Co. Sheriff's Office)
ANDERSON, SC (FOX Carolina) -
The Anderson County Sheriff's Office and the Anderson Police Department combined forces in a prostitution sting that resulted in seven arrests, according to Lt. Sheila Cole with the sheriff's office.

Cole said officers simultaneously entered six businesses throughout the county and posed as customers. The businesses were Ivy Spa, 2510 River Road, Piedmont; Bally Spa, 2 Halter Drive, Piedmont; VIP Spa, 3145 Cinema Center Boulevard, Anderson; Spring Spa, 95 Welpine Road, Anderson; Lucky Spa, 121 East-West Parkway, Anderson; and Sun Spa, 3312 North Main Street, Anderson. Cole said there were no licensed massage therapists at any of the businesses.

Cole said 14 deputies and 10 police officers participated in the operation, along with two investigators from the South Carolina Department of Revenue.

Six women were charged with prostitution during the sting, Cole said. Those women are Kyung Suk Woo, 56, of Duluth Georgia; Jung Ja Kim, 59, of Torrance California; Kyung Mi Haar, 46, of Doraville, Georgia; Sun Ah Cho, 33, of Anderson; Chom Suk Brantley, 61, of Raleigh, North Carolina; and Donna Lee, 52, of Duluth, Georgia.

Deputies also discovered that So Yeon Kim, 36, of Anderson, South Carolina was wanted in California. She was arrested and a fugitive from justice warrant was issued, Cole said.

The DOR investigators were there to review financial aspects of each business and seized money at all locations, Cole said. The Sheriff's Office seized $5,492.00 and Anderson Police seized $500.00.

Six suspects were transported to the Anderson County Detention Center, with the exception of Donna Lee, who was transported to the Anderson City Detention Center.

Copyright 2014 FOX Carolina (Meredith Corporation). All rights reserved.



Read more: http://www.wnem.com/story/25889831/seven-arrests-made-in-prostitution-sting#ixzz3PF9zTBhG



O'Asian Wellness and Spa in Boca Raton used for prostitution, police say

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2479
Background paper for the World Bank’s Gender Policy Research Report
STATE POLICIES AND WOMEN’S AUTONOMY
IN CHINA, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND INDIA 1950-2000:
lessons from contrasting experiences1

Monica Das Gupta*, Sunhwa Lee, Patricia Uberoi,
Danning Wang, Lihong Wang, and Xiaodan Zhang

Abstract
We compare changes in gender roles and women’s empowerment in China, the Republic of Korea, and India. Around 1950, when all these countries had new governments following revolution or the end of colonial rule, they were largely poor and agrarian, with many cultural commonalities which placed similar severe constraints on women’s autonomy. They adopted very different paths of development, which are known to have profoundly affected development outcomes in these countries. However, these choices have also had tremendous impact on gender outcomes, and today these countries show striking differences in the extent of gender equity achieved: China has achieved the most, and the Republic of Korea the least. We conclude that:
.
States can exert enormous influence over gender equity. They can mitigate cultural influences on women’s autonomy (as in China and India), or slow down thepaceof change in gender equity despite rapid integration of women in education, formal employment and urbanization (as in the Republic of Korea).

.
The impact of policies to provide opportunities for women’s empowerment can be greatly enhanced if accompanied by communication efforts to alter cultural values which place heavy constraints to women’s accessing these opportunities.


Acknowledgements: This paper draws on country reviews funded by the World Bank’s Gender Sector Board. The reviews were prepared by Danning Wang, Lihong Wang and Xiaodan Zhang (on China), Sunhwa Lee (on South Korea), and Patricia Uberoi (on India). It also draws on the Monica Das Gupta’s previous research on these countries, some of which was funded by the United Nations Population Fund to Harvard University.
Comments from Judith Banister, Lyn Bennett, Gillian Brown, Hill Gates and Mick Moore are gratefully acknowledged.
* Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433,USA. Email: mdasgupta@worldbank.org

Introduction
States implement a variety of interventions which directly and indirectly alter women’s capabilities, including legislation pertaining to the family and to the workplace, political representation, forms of affirmative action, broader development strategies relating to economic and social development, and the establishment of institutions of modern governance. However, women’s ability to benefit from such interventions can be heavily constrained by their relative voicelessness within the household and their immediate community. Policies need to be designed synergistically, to not only provide opportunities for greater empowerment through measures such as legislation and credit schemes, but also measures to alter values which constrain women from accessing these opportunities.
We examine the lessons from state policies in China, South Korea and Northern India to understand how states can be more effective in reducing women’s social marginalization and increasing their capabilities. The reason for selecting these settings is that they share certain aspects of social organization which create especial obstacles to women’s participation in development: above and beyond the more global issues of women’s burden of domestic work and inadequate access to productive resources. Strong commonalities in their systems of kinship and inheritance generate a stark and extremely effective logic of marginalizing women and making them powerless in public life and also, during their youth, in domestic life . which is reflected in some of the highest rates of excess female child mortality in the world (Table 1, Das Gupta 1995, 1999).
What makes a comparison of these countries especially interesting is the fact that they all had a new beginning around 1950, due either to the end of colonial rule or revolution. At that time, they were all essentially poor agrarian societies (Table 2) with a large agenda of nation-building and development ahead of them. Women’s lives were also fairly similar: they worked long hours to help make ends meet in their peasant households, and suffered maternal depletion from high levels of fertility and child mortality. In addition they coped with the powerlessness imposed by their position in the family. Since then, these countries have taken very different political and developmental paths, leading to quite different developmental achievements today (Table 3). Today, Republic of Korea today is highly urbanized and industrialized, with high levels of per capita income, life expectancy and education. India is still largely rural, with relatively low levels of income, life expectancy and education, and China is somewhere in between these two countries along these indices.
The three countries also differ enormously in the kinds of policies used to incorporate women into mainstream society, as a result of which the position of women has also taken quite divergent paths. These contrasts offer the opportunity to examine the effect of different developmental and policy settings have impacted on women’s living conditions and autonomy (Figure 1). To summarize our argument, we argue that the Communist Chinese state has made substantial strides in improving women’s lives, both through raising living standards as well as through a synergistic mix of policies aimed at creating gender equity. Republic of Korean state policies have sought successfully to achieve rapid economic growth while maintaining fundamental aspects of family organization deeply inimical to gender equity. As a consequence, women now have high living standards and are also incorporated extensively into the formal labor force, but have gained relatively little in autonomy. By contrast, the Indian state has a disappointing record on raising living standards, but has been moderately successful in encouraging gender equity.
Below, we describe the broad outlines of the system of kinship and inheritance in these settings, which so powerfully shape gender relations and women’s autonomy. We then discuss some key dimensions along which gender issues have been addressed in the development policies pursued by the three countries during the second half of the twentieth century. Of course, outcomes in gender equity result from the interplay of many economic and social factors. We single out four issues for special emphasis: education and employment, women’s health, family law and efforts to influence gender-related values and behavior through mass communication.

I Kinship Systems and the Construction of Gender in the three settings
These three settings have rigidly patrilineal kinship systems whose central features are strikingly similar, despite considerable local variation in detail. Since gender analyses often discuss the problems of patriarchy, it is necessary to clarify what is so exceptional about these particular family systems, and why they are so effective at marginalizing women. Patrilineality means that group membership is passed on through the male line. Typically, this involves passing on the main productive assets through the male line, which constrains women's ability to be economically viable without being attached to a man. Patrilocality means that it is normative for couples to live in the man's home. Women have rights of maintenance as daughters in their natal home, and as wives in their husband’s home, but they have no rights to own key productive assets such as land. The combination of rigid patrilineality and patrilocality essentially means that women have little independent social or legal personhood.
The logic of patrilineality is very rigid in these societies. For example, a man without sons would normally seek to adopt one from amongst his male kin rather than let a daughter inherit. Access to key economic and social assets depended on one’s position in a lineage, so enormous importance is placed on maintaining careful records of lineage ties between men for generations on end. Families without sons are recorded as having died out. Thus it is that only men constitute and reproduce the social order. The mother merely gives birth: it is through the father that a child acquires a social identity and is incorporated into the social order.2 Since only boys remain in the lineage, the significant social reproduction is that by the father of the son. Men are the fixed points in this social order, and women are the moving points because when they marry they leave their home and lineage, and are absorbed into their husband's lineage.
2 In India, the mother’s caste may affect that of her child in the rare event that her caste status is very different from that of her husband.
While women are socially marginalized, this is not to say that women are not valued in the household: wives are valuable sources of labor and progeny. By the same token, daughters have very limited value to their parents, as they are lost to their parents on marriage. An adult woman has no socially acceptable role in her parental family except as a visitor, nor can she have rights to their productive assets except for gifts on ritual occasions. As an adult she becomes extraneous to her family of birth, her appropriate position being a wife in another family. She must leave and make way for incoming daughters-in-law.3
Illustrative account of women’s position in the household in these settings:
A description of women’s lives in the North Indian village of Rampur around 19754 illustrates some of the constraints under which women live in such rigidly patrilineal societies. A young girl is trained to be tough and hardworking, yet completely subservient to the decisions of her male kin. Nevertheless, she enjoys a certain amount of personal freedom and autonomy in her own village, where all the men are her classificatory brothers, but this will be lost after marriage and not regained until old age.
When she marries and moves to her husband’s village, a girl’s behaviour must undergo a dramatic transformation. She loses almost all voice and autonomy. In her husband’s village she is a stranger, and custom requires that she remain with head bowed, not speaking. On her first visit, she must sit silently while the women of the family and their friends scrutinize and evaluate her. When visiting her parents’ village, she is again free to be as mobile and vocal as before.
A young bride’s personal and public behaviour is monitored by a whole array of women, including her husband’s mother, aunts, grandmother, sisters, and sisters-in-law. All the men in the household older than her husband are in a position of remote authority over her. She is at the bottom of both the age hierarchy as well as the gender hierarchy of the household, which means that she has minimal autonomy. She is given the most onerous household tasks, waking before dawn to fetch water, grind flour and churn butter.
With very limited opportunity or permission to get to know others in her marital village, she is usually very lonely and has little opportunity to make friends or participate in village life. At home myriad ways are used to keep the young wife and her husband apart, to delay the growth of a bond between them. Their daily tasks are performed mostly in different locations. Other occasions for marital privacy are also restricted. After completing the long day’s chores, a young woman is expected to massage her mother-in-law’s legs before being given permission to go to sleep.
A woman’s status rises when she has her first son. As her sons grow, her status increases until eventually she too becomes a mother-in-law. She is not called by her own name: instead, she will first be called “X’s wife”, and after a son is born “Y’s mother”. This not
3 Fieldwork conducted by Monica Das Gupta in North India between 1975-1990, and in China and the Republic of Korea in 1995-6 by Monica Das Gupta, Xie Zhenming, Li Bohua, and Bae hwa-Ok. 4 Fieldwork conducted by Monica Das Gupta.
only reflects her lack of individual identity in her husband’s village, but also reflects that her connection is not primarily to her husband but to his patrilineage.
Southern India is quite different, as many studies have pointed out. Women in South India can have considerable interaction with their parental family after marriage, and can function as independent social and legal entities in ways virtually unthinkable in the North. This is illustrated by the following condensed version of the life-history of a womanina Karnataka village5:
Lakshamma is the eldest of five sisters, they did not have a brother. When Lakshamma's parents died leaving three sisters still unmarried, she moved back to her parents' village with her husband. She sold some of her parents’ land to pay for her sisters' marriages, and divided the rest between the sisters. When her second sister left her alcoholic husband and came back to her parents' village, she used some of her share of the property to set up a teashop near the village bus-stand. Her business flourished, and she was able to educate her children well. Significantly, these women’s actions were not viewed as deviant by other villagers, including men. The village as a whole was supportive and respectful of them, and commended the eldest sister for her evenhanded division of the property.

Case-studies from China and South Korea6:
Interviews conducted in China and South Korea indicate that around the middle of this century, women had to contend with very similar patterns of familial relationship and structures of authority as those described above. This is illustrated by the following condensed accounts from field interviews.
(i)
South Korean woman now in her seventies and living in the southern city of Taegu: “Although my first child was a son, my mother-in-law was very angry with me because the next three were daughters. I would cook rice for the family, but my daughters and I were allowed to eat only millet. Feeling very guilty about bearing three daughters in a row, I felt I should be very obedient to my mother-in-law. I would wake up very early and do all the housework, work on the rice fields, feed the animals, and then weave until late into the night. I served my mother-in-law carefully, making sure never to sleep until she was comfortably asleep and could not need anything further. After my second daughter was born, she sent me off to work in the kitchen and the rice fields within days of the birth, not allowing the normal period of rest. My third daughter died. Later I had another son, but by then my mother-in-law had died.”

(ii)
Woman aged almost 70 years, in the northern Chinese province of Hebei, still living


5 Field interviews conducted by Monica Das Gupta, 1996.
6 Source: field interviews conducted by Monica Das Gupta, Bae Hwa-Ok, and Xie Zhenming 1996.

in the village into which she was married:
“My mother-in-law was a very harsh woman. My husband did not live at home,
he worked elsewhere and visited home from time to time. I had to serve my
mother-in-law handand foot. Inthe morning I hadto wake upand begin work
before she woke up. I also had to empty her chamberpot in the morning. Then I
worked all through the day, and could only go to sleep after she did...
My first child was a son, but she would not let me hold him. She insisted
that I just lie him flat on the bed and leave him alone all day while I worked.
She would not let me eat rice, only inferior grains. Once at the Spring
Festival my husband noticed that I did not get rice and asked her why this was so.
She agreed to let me have some that day, but my husband couldn't help me much
with my problems in the home.
When the Communist youth meetings began in the village, I attended a couple of them. They made me feel as though I had some group to which I belonged, outside my husband's household. But my mother-in-law forbade me from going to any more meetings, and I did not dare oppose her.”


II Gender and development policies in China, 1950s-1990s
The Chinese state has for centuries tried to manipulate and adapt its people’s lineage organization to serve its own ends. Patrilineal clan organization offers the state the possibility of reducing the costs of managing a large and farflung empire by passing on much of the burden of micro-administration to the family (Gates 1996; Fried 1969; Schurman 1968a and 1968b). This possibility has been formally exploited for centuries. For example, entire groups of families could be punished for one member’s crime: a powerful incentive for people to keep their kinfolk compliant with state directives. At the same time, the state has always had to contend with the possibility that lineages could become large and powerful enough to challenge state authority (Faure 1989; Hu 1948), a consideration which has kept the state vigilant and in some ways antagonistic towards the lineage system.
This pattern has continued after the Revolution. On the one hand, the state had many reasons to want to reduce the power of the family and lineage. It wanted to collectivize property ownership and production, and to make people obedient to the state instead of their lineage superiors. This could not be achieved without smashing lineage political organization, as well as age and gender hierarchies within the household. To achieve these goals, the Communist Party launched a frontal attack on lineage organization and ancestor worship7, and went far towards breaking age and gender hierarchies. The
7 These were Mao’s dictums from 1927 onwards, and had been tried out in the areas of Communist rule before 1949, such as in the Jianxi soviet in the late 1920s and in Yan’an after the Long March. Such things are difficult to eradicate, however. Many people continued their practices quietly in their homes, for example by leaving out some food in the kitchen for the ancestors (Peng Xizhe, personal communication). As soon as the Communist control was loosened after the late 1970s, people went back to more public manifestations of their customs.
commune took over many traditional familial functions in economic and political life, and in providing some social services (Andors 1983: 53-73).
And yet, the Communist state could not bring itself to abandon the strengths of the family system for ensuring social stability, caring for the old and unemployed and raising new generations of useful citizens. It left untouched the system of exogamy and patrilocal residence, whereby a man stayed in his own village and obtained rights to live and work there by dint of birth, whereas a woman moved to her husband’s family, losing her rights in her parents’ village and looking after his parents instead of her own. As described below, even if the state had wanted to change these fundamental features of social organization, it would have encountered overwhelming popular opposition.
With a strong ideological commitment to gender equity, the Communist Party has used the power of a totalitarian state to transform gender relations. During the 1950s women were brought out of the home to be paid for their work, to participate in political meetings and exercise their newly-acquired legal right to choose their own husband. During the Cultural Revolution this process accelerated. Since 1979, the state has given up some degree of interventionism to encourage private enterprise, which has brought some reversals for women. At the same time, this period has also opened up new opportunities for the women’s movement, as described below.
Education and Employment
Universal education was a priority for the Communist regime, equally for girls and boys, and impressive strides were made in providing basic education to people. Emphasis on this diminished with the advent of economic reforms. As a consequence, there is a growing gender gap in schooling, especially in rural areas (Honig and Hershatter 1988:36-37; Wolf 1985:124-6). There is also a gender gap in higher education. While production was collectively organized, women were also formally incorporated into the workforce in both agriculture and industry. Women gained both materially and psychologically from the replacement of family-based production by collective units. This radically altered the balance of power in the household. As wage earners, women commanded new respect and gained voice in family decision making. Their income was perceived to be essential for the family, and women were transformed from housewives to full participants in domestic and community life.
Since 1979, there has been a major change of direction as China shifted from collective production to a market economy. The work point system in the rural areas was given up and the family became the production unit once again under the “household responsibility” system. In urban areas, center-controlled job market and salary system was supplemented by private business under local administration’s regulation. The subsequent economic reforms have improved living standards enormously, but have had a more mixed impact on gender equity. Especially in the vast agricultural sector, women’s work is once again becoming invisible, which can potentially reduce their intra-household bargaining power.
The sexual division of labor has deepened, with men migrating to higher-paying jobs outside the agrarian sector and women remaining to take care of agricultural production. Women are also gaining employment in the mushrooming private sector in urban and rural areas, but this involves mostly young unmarried women with poor working conditions and insecure jobs (Andors 1984:293; Gu 1997; Wolf 1985:59-61), supplementing their parents’ income until they marry.
In urban areas, reform of state-owned enterprises has led to discriminatory practices against women. They are more likely to be laid off and less likely to be hired or promoted8. They are also more likely to be given lower-paid jobs. Foreign-invested firms in particular discriminate heavily against women as they are not subject to close scrutiny from the government on the working conditions and job security. For some women, the reduction of income has caused a marked drop in family and social status (Woo 1994: 280-8).
With increased pressures to be efficient, enterprises are decreasingly willing to make necessary concessions for women’s reproductive roles. Women are perceived as less available than men to work overtime, and more likely to take time off for family emergencies. Government’s efforts to protect women’s welfare and to alleviate their double burden only serves to peripheralize them as workers, because employers find it expensive to provide benefits for maternity and child care. Consequently, women are disproportionately likely to be laid off their jobs: according to a 1987 poll of 660 enterprises, 64 percent of the surplus industrial workers were women (Lu 1988:19). Professional woman also suffer like their Western counterparts: those who takes a few years off to raise a child or two will rarely catch up with their male colleagues. Increasing numbers of women are becoming self-employed workers in small businesses, domestic labor or home-based production on contract from factories.
Efforts to protect women workers have been double-edged weapons. During the 1950s and early 1960s, women were given special consideration at work during menstruation, pregnancy, birth, and breast-feeding. The motive was both to protect women and also enable them to raise healthy children. During the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis changed to one in which women were no different from men (Woo 1994:279). After 1979, these forms of protection were reinstated9. However, they have been used to justify lower wages for women, and they also run the risk of reinforcing the stereotype that a woman’s primary role is reproduction. Another gender gap is introduced by mandatory retirement for women 5 years earlier than for men. This does little for gender equity, but helps the state by freeing up middle-aged women to look after aging parents-in-law, grandchildren and the home while their daughters-in-law go out to work.
8 This had happened only rarely in the preceding decades, in extreme circumstances such as in the early 1960s after the Famine, when female industrial workers were more likely to be laid off. Source: Danning Wang’s field work in Tianjin between 1996 and 1997. 9 The two regulations are the Provisional Regulations for Health Care for Women Employees, known as the 1986 Health Care Regulations, and the Regulations Governing Labor Protection for Female Staff Members and Workers, known as the 1988 Labor Protection Regulations. Both were the joint products of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Labor and Personnel, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the All-China Women’s Federations (Woo, 1994).

Women’s Health
Communist China has consistently placed high priority on improving the people’s health, and in this has greatly improved living standards. While the overall thrust has been on public health, many of the efforts have necessarily been specifically geared towards women. Without this, it was not possible to meet their goals of reducing child mortality and exposure to disease.10 Health education was especially geared towards women, who were assumed responsible for household health and sanitation. Public education on reproductive health and hygiene was also included, on topics such as menstruation, pregnancy, sexual intercourse, and breast feeding, etc.(Evans 1997:146). This was also designed to help establish conjugal harmony, consistent with the 1950 Marriage Law (Evans 1997:2). A prenatal health care campaign was launched to modernize midwifery practices (Goldstein 1998:153), and this helped to radically reduce infant and maternal mortality.
Women’s health also benefited from interventions driven by other agendas, notably population control. Viewed as a top national priority since the mid 1960s, the state made extensive use of its remarkable machinery of intervention to spread information about the need to reduce fertility, make contraceptive technology available, and ensure implementation of population control goals (Peng 1989). While this program has sometimes been harsh in implementation, it was accompanied by strenuous efforts to ensure good conditions for pregnancy, delivery, and child health, leading to rapid improvements in maternal and child health (Sidel and Sidel 1982).

Family law
From the outset, the Communist party has tried to give women equal legal rights as men, including in many aspects of family law. These laws constituted frontal attacks on the traditional family system. Predictably, crucial aspects of these reforms elicited strong popular resentment. While emphasizing social stability, the state would compromise the implementation of its new policies and laws when they threatened familial stability.
The Marriage Law of 1950 was truly radical. It sought to eliminate arranged marriages, brideprice, and child-marriage. Women were given the right to choose their own partners and demand a divorce, and rights to inherit property and control of their children. Female cadres attached to the Women’s Federation were given the task of implementing these policies at the village and household level, with the active cooperation and support of other cadres.
The law met deep-seated and violent resistance from men as well as older women, both of whom stood to lose control over their young daughters and daughters-in-law (Andors 1984; Croll 1981; Davin 1995). It came to be known as the “divorce law”, and resulted in an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 suicides and murders of women between 1950 and 1953
sh and Whyte (1978:85-91); Sidel and Sidel (1982); Whyte and Parish (984:69-71).
(Davin 1976: 87). Widespread peasant opposition to the implementation threatened social and political instability. Moreover, the state had a strong interest in maintaining a stable family system because of its functional utility. Thus, although the Marriage Law was well-intentioned and its implementation had successfully reduced the incidence of arranged marriages and increased the domestic autonomy of young women, its implementation slacked off when it began to threaten the family system and to generate political disaffection (Andors 1983; Park 1990).
The other example was in the process of reducing domestic violence. Local cadres are expected to mediate in resolving disputes, reduce violence and raise consciousness of how women are oppressed within the household and more specific problems such as husbands spending too much on alcohol. This has given women much support in domestic matters and increased their self-confidence. However, cadres are much less likely to support women when lineage interests are threatened. For example, women received little support in claiming rights to land which deviate from customary norms.
A fundamental clash between the peasants’ and the state’s approach to regulating women’s rights created problems in implementing the state’s family laws. The 1950s and 1980s Marriage Laws sought to give women equal control over productive resources. A further attempt to give women equal rights of inheritance was made in the Inheritance Law which came into force in 1985 and prohibited gender discrimination in inheritance. However, rural customary laws continue to regulate women’s right according to their marital status and residence. Moreover, the state has avoided directly indicating what share of property married-out daughters should inherit.
In reality, land is allocated on the basis of village residence, and residence continues with few exceptions to be determined patrilineally. When women marry their allotment is withdrawn, to make room for others such as in-coming daughters-in-laws. Thus there are many obstacles to women’s claiming their rights, for example if her marriage does not work out (Das Gupta and Li 1999). Village cadres, themselves members of the village patrilineages, would be unlikely to support a woman against her husband and his male kin in opposing the separation of family property in the case of divorce. Although the 1980 New Marriage Law made it much easier for rural women to obtain a divorce and leave difficult marriage, women still face obstacles of financial viability and social stigma in the villages.
Men’s rights are further strengthened by a provision for an extra share of the inheritance for those who look after the parents. This reinforces another key aspect of women’s marginalization, namely that sons customarily provide old age support. The 1950 Marriage Law sought to change this by implying that both sons and daughters have the duty to support their parents. In reality, however, many practices reinforced traditional norms of old age support. For example, when parents had no work unit to reimburse their medical expenses, the oldest son’s work unit would generally contribute as it was perceived to be his responsibility. In rural China, parents continue to live with their sons, and it is still rare for married women to contribute to this11.
The New Marriage Law passed in 1980 reinforced this social custom by requiring children to assume responsibility for their aged parents. Women are once again encouraged to be good daughters-in-law. This has given a new dimension to the age-old conflict between mothers-and daughters-in-law (Honig and Hershatter 1988: 168-69). In the face of a rapidly aging population, the state encourages stable familial support for the aged and is unlikely to alter course on this issue.

Social engineering through Mass Communication
In China, the media and publishing industry are under the strict control of the Communist Party and the state, and all channels of communication have been actively used to promote their policies on women. During the 1950s and 1960s, when the socialist state was being constructed, there was a strong thrust towards emancipating women. All means of communication were mobilized to this end, with remarkable success in demolishing many of the bases of women’s oppression. To spread awareness of the new Marriage Law and reduce cultural resistance to its implementation, extensive use was made of the story of a young girl (Xiao Qin) who fought her mother, the match-maker and other villagers in order to marry her lover.
Massive propaganda efforts used female role models to alter the view that women were intellectually and otherwise inferior to men, and to encourage people to think of women as having the same rights and duties as men. Significantly, these role models were workers or peasants: a major departure from the pre-Revolutionary days when gender equity was the domain of the educated urban elites. In the 1950s, a few outstanding urban workers received much public attention and later went on to be elected as political leaders. The same was true of what came to be known as “Iron Girls Teams”: groups of young women who took on the most difficult and demanding tasks at work to show that they could be as strong as men. This received enormous publicity and quickly became a standard fixture in every factory and collective farm.
The Cultural Revolution brought a new twist to this effort by conveying the message that real heroines are totally committed to the revolution and disinterested in being wives and mothers. Young women were portrayed dressed in male army uniform looking ready to beat Mao’s enemies to death. This role model was emulated by the millions of girls who joined the Red Guards and violently challenged many forms of authority, including their teachers and their parents. Under the patronage of Madame Mao, dramas were popularized in which women were shown struggling alone (and successfully) in combating the conservative men around them12.
11 The stituation is quite different in urban areas, where it has become normal for married daughters to help their parents financially and physically 12 Honig and Hershatter (1988). For example, Fang Haizhen in the Shanghai Harbor, with a sharp intellect and better knowledge of industry, is a more qualified leader than her male colleagues. In the Ode to the Dragon River, Jiang Shuiying had an insight into society and human nature, and her broad mind humbles
The new complexities of women’s lives in the new market economy of China are mirrored in how women are portrayed in literature, newspapers and journals, television programs, commercial advertisements, movies and soap operas. These sometimes portray women as housewives and sex objects and introduce female stereotypes adept at manipulating men for financial gain, despite a law against using sexually charged images of women in advertisements (Bu 1998; Zhao 1997). Counterbalancing this are portraits of successful career women successful career women awkward with the roles the family prescribes to them (Rofel 1994).

Women’s organizations
The first tide of the modern women’s liberation movement in China emerged after Britain invaded China in the Opium War of 1840. This national crisis triggered a serious examination of how to strengthen the society and polity. The Constitutional Reform and Modernization Movement advocated reforms to improve women’s lives, such as educating women and discouraging polygyny and foot-binding. This movement failed (Lu and Zhen, 1990), but gender issues were re-opened in 1919 as part of a broader movement for political reform. The agenda was broadened to include women’s right to choose their husband, their right to be sexually active before marriage and after widowhood, rights of inheritance, women’s education and work, prostitution, and foot-binding (Li and Zhang, 1994).
These efforts at social reform were interrupted by the political and administrative chaos generated by internal wars between warlords and between the Communists and the Kuomintang, as well as by the Japanese invasion during the Second World War. In the regions controlled by the Communists, efforts were initiated to break age and gender hierarchies along the lines developed further after 1949. With the establishment of Communist control over the entire country, these efforts were spread across China, as described above.
The economic reforms carried out since the late 1970s brought an end to the era of intense pro-active support by the state of women’s liberation. The state continues to be active, through organizations such as the Women’s Federation. However, more independent women’s organizations have also come up under the leadership of educated women13, which maintain a working relationship with the Women’s Federations areas (Li and Zhang, 1994). Both the Women’s Federation and women’s NGOs advocate women’s independence gained through means such as education and skill training programs. They are concerned with minimizing the negative implications for women of the market economy: including job insecurity, growing gender gaps in schooling in rural areas, the return of prostitution, and the misuse of women’s images in advertisements. Thus
all the menaroundher. Ke Xiang in the Red Azalea Mountain was a legendary heroine who went to a group of outlaws and single-handedly transformed them into Red Army soldiers. . 13 The term non-governmental is used to describe any institute or organization not set within the official network according to the will of party authorities. This kind of organization was allowed to exist legally only after the late 1970s.
women’s movements in China today are returning to the forms of women’s movement common in other countries and prevalent in China before the Revolution.


III Gender and development policies in the Republic of Korea, 1950s-1990s
The Republic of Korea’s rapid economic growth over the past four decades has been acclaimed as one of the success stories in the world’s development efforts. The initial industrialization process began during the Japanese colonial occupation (1910-1945), creating a modern infrastructure in the areas of finance, production, transportation, and commerce. However, a good part of the heavy industry and development of railway communication was concentrated in the region which subsequently became North Korea, as it was adjacent to the rich coal and iron reserves of Manchuria. Radical land reform was carried out, starting in 1947 during the American occupation and completed after the Korean War. This enhanced the process of breaking traditional Korean power structures to create an egalitarian society, which was a crucial basis for subsequent development (Koo 1987; M.Lee 1982).
Then came the Korean War with a devastating toll on the country. After the war, successive governments had a strong commitment to rebuild the war-torn country into a prosperous industrial country. During 1960-1995, the economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In the late 1950s, the country’s GNP per capita was less than $100, and over 40% of the population suffered from absolute poverty. By 1995, it had become the world’s fifteenth largest economy, with a per capita GNP of over $10,000 (UNDP 1998). This stunning pace of development has included rapid improvements in people’s levels of education, health, and living standards. Poor in land and natural resources, the government concentrated on building a skilled and healthy workforce to lay the basis for rapid industrialization.
This emphasis on human development and economic growth has dramatically transformed the living conditions of women as well as men. However, women’s position in the family and society has been slow to change. The land reform redistributed land to male heads of household, and had little implication for gender equity. State policy has made considerable effort to protect Korean culture in the face of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Patrilineal social organization and segregated gender roles are perceived to be central to Korean culture, and consequently state policy has sought to preserve them. The social, economic, and political participation of Korean women are still among the lowest in the world (KIHASA and UNDP 1998).
Education and Employment
Traditional education in Korea was based on the Confucian Classics, and was confined to males, mostly the sons of the aristocratic, yangban class. From the 1880s, modern education for girls and boys was introduced by Christian missionaries, and many schools also began to be established by Korean intellectuals. The Japanese colonial government organized a modern educational system and put great emphasis on primary schooling of both girls and boys with a political as well as economic agenda: that is, to convert young Koreans into loyal subjects and skilled laborers (Mason et al. 1980). In the case of girls, the objective was to train girls to be ”good wives and wise mothers”. When Korea became independent in 1945, the enrollment rate at the primary level was about 45% (McGinn et al.1980).
Much destruction took place during the Korean War, but immediately after the war the government concentrated on primary education, with the explicit objectives not only of increasing people’s skills but also of inculcating anti-Communist thought and “moral education”. Thus once again a combination of political and economic agendas helped give education strong state backing. Primary schooling became universal by the mid-1960s, but a substantial gender gap in educational attainment persisted at the higher levels. The gap in middle and high school enrollment rates began to narrow only in the 1970s and did not close completely until 1980 and 1995 respectively. Although there is still a wide gender gap in enrollment in higher education, women’s enrollment has risen sharply in recent decades, from below 9% in 1980 to 45% in 1996.
Women’s participation in the labor force has risen substantially in recent years. However, women in most occupations face gender discrimination, including in hiring practices, wage differentials, limited opportunities for long-term employment, and male-oriented culture of the workplace. In any given occupational category, women tend to have the positions with the lowest pay and status. Given their relatively poor prospects in the job market, one major incentive for women to enroll in higher education is to increase their chances of marrying men with higher incomes14. This is also reflected in parents’ responses to the question of why they want to educate their children. In the case of sons they emphasize “good job” while for daughters they stress “marriage and connections” (National Statistical Office 1996). The Equal Employment Act of 1987 has made explicit discrimination against married women illegal, but strong cultural norms regarding women’s proper role as wife and mother continue to prevail and many employers and employees alike expect that female staff will leave their jobs when they marry.

Women’s Health
The government’s development strategy has included a heavy emphasis on improving levels of health and reducing fertility15. Extensive efforts in preventive health services combined with improvements in nutrition and living conditions to bring about a rapid decline in mortality (UNDP 1998). Part of this effort was carried out under the nationwide ‘New Community Movement’ (Saemaul Undong), organized by the government for rural development16. The success of these efforts was very impressive: the average life expectancy at birth for women increased from 53.7 years in 1960 to 77.4 years in 1995, and that for men increased from 51.1 to 69.5 years (KIHASA and UNDP 1998).
14 K.Kim (1990); S.Lee (1997), M. Park (1991).
15 Whang (1986); KIHASA and UNDP (1998); S.Kim (1998).
and UNDP (1998); Y. Kim (1980).

From 1962, a nationwide blitzkrieg was launched to reduce population growth, overcoming concerns that contraception might subvert traditional culture and sexual morality (Kim et al. 1972). In conjunction with improving health conditions and better conditions of delivery, this enabled women’s reproductive health to improve rapidly, and also contributed towards a rapid reduction in child mortality (KIHASA and UNDP 1998).
The state’s commitment to family planning had some other indirect beneficial fallouts for women. Firstly, it provided an acceptable forum for women to coalesce into some formal organization. During the 1950s, some women’s organizations had already formed around this issue (Kim et al. 1972). During the 1960s and 1970s, this process received state backing, as the state encouraged the formation of Mothers’ Clubs nationwide at the grassroots level to disseminate contraceptive information and supplies.
Another indirect positive fallout for women from the family planning program came in the mid-1970s, when it was perceived that in order to maintain the pace of fertility decline it was necessary to try to reduce the strong cultural preference for sons. This made the government more receptive to women’s organizations’ demand for changing the Family Law to reduce the hold of patrilineal social structure (E.Kim 1991). Since the late 1980s, the government’s receptiveness to these demands received a further major boost from strong concerns that the high sex ratios at birth will lead to a shortage of future wives (KIHASA and UNDP 1998).

Family law
In principle, the legal rights of Korean women were assured by the 1948 Constitution, which stated that all citizens are equal before the law. This was a great improvement over the previous situation in which, without their husbands’ approval, women were legally debarred from credit or property transactions, mediating disputes, initiating lawsuits or making donations (J.Kim 1993). In practice, however, there has been very slow change in women’s legal rights during this century.
The customary family law, which severely restricts women’s legal rights, was given legal backing by being formalized in the Civil Code of 1962. It improved some aspects of women’s lives, in that the possibility of formal adoption was extended also to girls; women were allowed to inherit what the family head might want to give them; and male and female adultery were treated equally as grounds for divorce. However, the key changes required for gender equality were ignored. Under pressure to avoid the demographic fallout of strong son preference as well as the efforts of women’s organizations, the government substantially revised the Family Law in 1990. Yet even today it contains some key provisions effective in curtailing women’s autonomy.
As the Family Law has been so central to the fight for women’s rights in the Republic of Korea, it needs to be described at some length. The family registration system (hojuk) was the way in which clans and their component families kept records of their membership, and of births, deaths and marriages of family members. On this basis, people are incorporated into or excluded from family membership, and allocated rights of inheritance as well as duties of ancestor worship. For example, the eldest brother would customarily receive a larger share of family property, and with it the duty of looking after his parents and ancestors.
Women move from one clan to another on marriage, and this too was formally recorded by having her name transferred from her family registry of birth to that of her family of marriage. The children born in a marriage are entered in the father’s family registry. Thus a woman’s social and legal identity is derived from her relationship to the male head of the family, even if this is her grandson. In the event of divorce, a woman had little chance of obtaining child custody, alimony or a share of joint marital property unless the husband consented to it. This gave women strong incentives to avoid divorce at all costs. Formalized into the Family Law, these customary rules formed the legal basis for the definition of family headship, relatives, marriage, divorce, inheritance, property, and so on. The Family Law was mildly amended in 1977, and more substantially in 1990 after decades of effort by women’s organizations. The key changes made in 1990 are as follows (KIHASA and UNDP 1998; E.Kim 1991):
.
Men continue to be heads of household, but the eldest son has the choice of

relinquishing the duties of supporting his parents, ancestors and unmarried siblings. This may sound like a meager victory for women, but in fact it holds significant potential for altering the family system. Caring for parents and ancestors is central to maintaining the continuity of the patrilineage, and reduced emphasis on this is a crucial step towards removing the cultural basis for women’s social marginalization.

.
Relatives were earlier defined to extend to the husband’s third cousins and the wife’s

first cousins. Under the revised law, they extend also to the third cousins of the wife. When an American feminist colleague heard of this, she exclaimed “What’s the point of that?” Yet in the context of Korean culture, it signifies an expansion of the social recognition given to women.

.
Women’s right to inherit parental property is expanded. In the absence of a will,the

property is to be distributed evenly among the children regardless of sex. Clearly it is still easy for parents to contravene this law by making a will. However, parents may be less reluctant than in the past to allow their daughters some inheritance rights, because the population is now overwhelmingly urban. The real sticking point on women’s property rights hinges around inheriting land, which is completely incompatible with customary norms of exogamy and patrilocal residence. In urban areas, it is possible to have more egalitarian inheritance without threatening the very fabric of social organization. Thus there is, in principle, scope for the new laws to be implemented with little of the mayhem encountered in China and Northern India, described below.

.
Women’s rights to inherit her deceased husband’s property have also been expanded. Under the revised law, both widowers and widows will inherit jointly with their children; and if there are no children, each of them will become a co-heir with the spouse’s lineal ascendants.


This has another important implication: if a woman dies without children, her parents can be co-heirs to her property along with her husband. Although such circumstances are unlikely to be common, this is a highly significant departure from the traditional family system. The principle has been established that a woman’s parents have some claims over a daughter even after her marriage, which may help increase the value of daughters relative to sons.
.
Both husband and wife have equal rights to any property acquired during marriage,

and are entitled to claim for its division upon divorce. This is obviously a major improvement in the position of Korean women, who otherwise had little choice to exit difficult or abusive marriages.

.
Child custody is no longer granted automatically to the father. It is now determined by mutual agreement of the couple or failing that by the family court.

.
Marriage continues to be prohibited between people of the same clan. Thus patrilineages continue to be required to be exogamous.


The first and the last provisions above continue to be key concerns for women’s organizations, as they are central to the continuation of patrilineal social organization and consequently women’s social marginalization. The insistence on male headship in particular is perceived as the principal source of gender inequality in the family and in the workings of other social institutions.

Social engineering through Mass Communication
As in the case of education and employment, the state encouraged women’s emancipation to the extent that it helped meet national development objectives, while making sure that the emancipation did not go further than strictly required. Thus women were encouraged to play an active role in the national drive for community development (Saemaul Undong) during the 1970s, and also participate in the decision-making processes in the village general assembly. This was a radical departure from custom:
In Korea’s past…women were treated rather as limited personalities and prohibited from
participating in any public or social activities. Even within the family major decisions
were beyond the scope of women’s involvement (Whang 1981:103). It was noted that women were much more enthusiastic than men about striving to improve their living conditions and family income. They participated actively in programs for savings, non-formal education and agricultural extension, as well as family planning, environmental improvement and income-generation. The Saemaul Women’s Associations also organized communal kitchens during the busy farming seasons, operated daycare centers and used extra funds in ad hoc ways such as contributing to building piped water systems and public baths (Whang 1981:108-9).
Until the mid-1980s, the Korean mass media was under the strict supervision of the government, which had limited interest in women’s emancipation. The popular dramas in the 60s usually portrayed women as virtuously and resolutely enduring domestic problems. For instance, one popular drama focused on a woman who was being treated very badly by her mother-in-law while also making sacrifices for her son’s success. Another program depicted a woman who was making sacrifices for the husband all through her life, and embracing her husband’s family members despite the terrible ordeals they caused.
As the Korean economy developed through the 70s and 80s, career women have increasingly come to be represented in TV dramas. However, they are generally portrayed in “acceptable” female occupations, and their primary concerns still revolve around men and marriage. Career women are portrayed approvingly only if they also succeed in fulfilling their traditional familial roles well and can keep their husbands happy. In recent dramas, another theme is that of women’s careers as a source of marital conflict, with images of career women creating family problems while men are shown as reliable family heads. This is especially surprising given that most of these family dramas are written by female writers (K.Lee 1989).
A hopeful trend in recent dramas has been a rise of support given to women’s pursuit of their careers by their parents, parents-in-laws, and husbands: for example, by raising the subject of how a woman should not waste her education by withdrawing from the labor force after marriage. These reflect some changing attitudes within the country, as shown in surveys (KIHASA and UNDP 1998). Yet this is accompanied by only limited efforts to encourage men to share domestic duties, which is still perceived as demeaning to men and greatly disapproved by parents-in-law.
Recently, there has been more open discussion of some critical gender issues, such as rape, domestic violence and sexual harassment in the workplace. This helps give some legitimacy to women’s growing concerns about their lives and increased awareness of gender equity issues amongst the audience (K. Lee 1989).
While fictional dramas in TV have increasingly been dealing with changing roles of women in Korean society.albeit in a limited way--other TV programs such as news or entertainment programs have maintained a more traditional orientation. For instance, female anchor positions on news programs are confined to good-looking single women, who mostly leave their position when they get married while their male counterparts continue for decades. These highly visible forms of gender differentiation further reinforce the already prevalent views of women’s limited roles in public life. In sum, although portrayals of Korean women in TV programs have gone through some changes over the years, they still appear to reinforce conventional stereotypes of women’s social position.

Women’s Organizations
A number of women’s organizations were established in Korea during the period of Japanese colonial occupation, mostly as part of a wider political movement for independence, but also with an agenda for women’s welfare (Y.Kim 1986). Some socialist women’s organizations also sprang up, advocating gender equality more strongly. Since the 1950s, a variety of women’s organizations have been formed. Some have been directly concerned with immediate issues of equal pay or legal concerns, others have focused more on political changes and human rights reforms, while still others engage in voluntary community activities (Palley 1994).
The average number of women representatives in past legislatures in Korea has been at most 2%, and currently women hold only 1.5% of all high-level government positions (KIHASA and UNDP 1998). Given this minimal political representation, women’s organizations have been a primary channel for bringing women’s concerns to the attention of policy makers. However, their effectiveness has depended heavily on the extent to which their roles have meshed with the priorities of the state. For instance, the Mothers’ Clubs received strong state support and were highly effective during the 60s and 70s when they were important for the national programs for family planning and community development, but they have dwindled in significance since then. Women’s labor organizations met with little success in their efforts since the mid-70s to improve women’s working conditions. Only recently have their efforts even begun to bear fruit. The slow progress in changing Korea’s family law also illustrates how little weight is given to women’s concerns. The 1970s and 1980s brought international efforts to improve the status of women across the world. This encouraged women’s organizations to push for further reforms in the family law. On its part, the government also became more proactive. It established a Special Advisory Commission on Women in 1983, and in 1986 it added a plan for women’s development to the Sixth Social and Economic Development Plans. At the same time, organizations such as the Korean League of Women Voters began to lobby political candidates to vote for a family law reform and exhorted women not to vote for candidates who did not support this (E.Kim 1991). All these efforts combined with economic and demographic exigencies to bring about the 1990 revision of the Family Law, which for all its limitations represents a significant break from the past.


IV Gender and development policies in India, 1950s-1990s
From the early days of colonial contact, the British and the Indians developed an active exchange of ideas. Beginning around 1800, there were a series of movements to reform aspects of social custom and religious beliefs that were perceived as impinging on human welfare and dignity. These included movements against some of the injustices perpetrated on women and later also against the caste system (Heimsath 1964; Nair 1996). A series of efforts have been made since then by the Indian political and social leadership to improve women’s position in society, including demanding female suffrage at about the same time as it was granted in Britain (Forbes 1996).
The circumstances leading up to independence played an important role in shaping the state’s policy imperatives, including those concerned with women’s empowerment. The independence movement included a serious interest in integrating women into mainstream public life. At the same time, the independence movement sought to create a democratic and secular polity, and was successful in achieving this goal. This has constrained efforts to empower women, as the political leadership has had to keep an eye on the demands of different constituencies, especially those of religious groups seeking to maintain their identity in the secular society.
India’s achievements in gender equity are quite mixed. On the one hand, considerable effort has been made to use legislation and social engineering to bring women into the mainstream of society. Women’s own efforts to mobilize to improve their lives have mostly received official encouragement, albeit sometimes not as actively as could be wished. As a result, women have come a very long way in India from the position they were in early in this century. Yet the pace of change has often been painfully slow, especially in the spheres of health, education and poverty reduction. This has profoundly affected its ability to improve women’s living conditions and to implement the laws and policies for ensuring women’s autonomy.
Education and Employment
The agenda for social reform in India stressed the importance of women’s education as a way of improving their status. Christian missionaries began the process in the early nineteenth century, and it was soon taken up by the social reform movements and Hindu religious reform movements, and by the colonial government (Forbes 1996). The Indian Constitution stipulated in 1949 the goal of providing free and compulsory education for all children up to age 14, and to achieve this on a universal basis within 10 years. Yet progress has been very slow: only 39% of females aged 7+ were literate (Basu 1999).
The real indictment of India’s education policy is that it has used budgetary allocations to develop subsidized institutions of higher learning for the children of the elites, neglecting primary education for the majority of people. Gaps in educational attainment by income level and by rural-urban residence are high, and the most neglected are people living in the rural areas of Northern India (PROBE Report). Gender gaps in education are also significant, and are larger the lower the overall educational attainment of a group (Filmer and Pritchett forthcoming). There are small signs of improvement here: of all children enrolled in school, girls constituted 28% in 1951 and this had risen to 42% by 1991. A similar picture emerges of women’s employment. The most serious problem is not a gender gap, but the lack of growth of employment opportunities.
The legal system offers several kinds of protection to women workers. The Constitution guarantees women’s rights to equal opportunity in employment. It also seeks to protect women workers by discouraging their employment in dangerous occupations and industries, and the provision of maternity benefits and creches for children. In practice, these attempts have had limitations. They are inadequately implemented, and in any case apply only to formal sector employment that accounts for a small fraction of total employment. Moreover, they serve to make it less attractive for employers to hire women in the industrial workforce.

Women’s Health
The health transition in India has been hampered by much the same factors as the education transition: the elites have diverted resources to provide for the expensive tertiary-level facilities that serve their own needs. The needs of rural areas and of the urban poor are consequently neglected except in a few states committed to overall social development. This neglect combines with poverty and malnutrition and illiteracy to produce a slow pace of improvements in health (Shiva, Goyal and Krishnan 1992).
Women and children have borne much of the brunt of poor health conditions, because of poor conditions of childbearing. Malnutrition results in women entering their childbearing years in poor physical condition, and suffering further depletion with each birth. Infants suffer from low birthweight, poor care at delivery and poor health support during their early vulnerable years. Some regions have especially high levels of child mortality, which results in their mothers suffering through even more pregnancies in ordertoreach desiredfamily size(L.Visaria 1999).
Family planning received much more serious attention than health. A major crop failure during the mid-1960s alerted the government to the urgent need to raise food production and simultaneously reduce the number of mouths to feed. Both objectives were embarked on with much seriousness of purpose, creative organization, and considerable success. The family planning program has done a great deal to improve maternal health, though its primary goal was population control.

Family law
India’s cultural diversity is mirrored in enormous heterogeneity in family systems, which greatly complicates efforts to modify family law. Northwest India is characterized by rigidly patrilineal rules of residence and inheritance, as described above. Most of the rest of Northern India has similar norms but in somewhat modified form, since people are not organized into territorially-based clans. In contrast, parts of South and Eastern India had matrilineal systems of descent and inheritance, while in yet others children of both sexes inherit from both parents.
Colonial policies were highly supportive of the more patrilineal systems and effectively dismantled the matrilineal systems, particularly in the Southwest (Nair 1996; Saradamoni 1996). By and large, the British sought to interfere little in the operation of local customs (Kosambi 1996), but the exigencies of revenue-collection required codifying systems of land-ownership and inheritance into tidy administration-friendly forms (Smith 1996). This process of formalizing systems inevitably meant reducing the diversity of family forms and their potential mutability17.
For maximizing revenues with minimum management, it was difficult to beat the cost-effectiveness of the Northwest Indian system, where peasant owner-cultivators had high incentives to invest in increasing production, and were organized into units which could be mobilized to ensure that revenues were paid. This was what the Chinese state had also discovered. This system received much administrative support, and Northwest India became the source of massive food exports to the rest of India and the world, but this support reinforced the kinship system which marginalized women.
At the time of Independence, there was quite serious political commitment to gender equity in the nationalist leadership. Before independence, a subcommittee of the National Planning Committee of the Congress Party was appointed to consider how to “remove all obstacles and handicaps in realizing an equal status and opportunity for women”
17 See papers in Sangari and Vaid 1989 and Uberoi 1996.
(National Planning Committee 1947). Among its recommendations was the demand for a civil code applicable to all citizens, under which women would have equal rights of inheritance and equality with men in respect of marriage and divorce laws.
However, as became clear over time, there were serious political obstacles to reforming family law and enforcing constitutionally guaranteed rights to equality before the law. One obstacle was the principle of federalism, under which states have the power to legislate on many issues, including health, education, social welfare and agricultural land: the latter being a particularly critical issue in overwhelmingly agrarian India. As a result, women continue to have little control over land, particularly in the Northern states (Agarwal 1994). Another critical obstacle was the principle of religious freedom, whereby family or “personal” law was different according to individual religious affiliation: Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi.
Since Hindus could not claim protection as a religious minority, the state exercised greater initiative in amending Hindu family laws to improve gender equity despite vociferous opposition (Parashar 1992). A series of radical laws comprising the Hindu Personal Law Code were passed in 1955 and 1956: banning bigamy; facilitating divorce; countering child marriage. Widows were given full rights to their husbands’ property, where previously they had rights only to maintenance for life. Girls and boys were to inherit equally, and from both their father as well as their mother. However, all this applies only if there is no will, so in practice people are free to implement their own cultural norms with regard to children’s inheritance (Agarwal 1994; Sarkar 1999). In Northwest India, there have been cases in which brothers have murdered a sister who has dared lay claim to their father’s land.
Notwithstanding resistance, legislation has sought consistently to enter the private domestic sphere to protect women from various abuses. During the colonial period, Hindu social reformers and colonial administrators combined to pass a series of laws, including laws banning widow-immolation (1829), enabling Hindu widows to remarry (1856), banning female infanticide (1870) and against child marriage (1891, 1929). These efforts continued after independence. Alarmed by a rise in dowry pressures, a law in 1961 sought to ban dowry. Despite this, the problem of dowries and associated violence has continued to grow, and new laws were passed in the mid-1980s facilitating prosecution of people for receiving dowry and for dowry-related violence against women. Also in 1983, stronger penalties for rape were put in place, and the onus of proof shifted from the victim to the accused man.

Social engineering through Mass Communication
The Indian government has developed a range of mass communication channels, and has actively used them as an instrument to further its development policies and programs18. Radio alone is estimated to reach 93% of the population in the early 1990s (Planning Commission 1992). Television has sought to be brought to a wide audience through
18 The central coordinating authority is the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, which is responsible for programming entertainment as well as for disseminating development-oriented messages.
community television sets, further enhanced in the 1980s with satellite broadcasting. By the early 1990s, television reached an estimated 54% of the population.
The state has enormous capacity to organize communication campaigns, using a variety of highly creative methods. Entertainment “serials” and “soaps” are designed to carry an explicit “social” or developmental message, as well as to entertain. Given the perceived need for reducing the rate of population growth, an especially enterprising program was designed to spread the family planning message. This was done through television, radio, print, ubiquitous billboards and advertisements, street theatre, community-level organizations of women (Mahila Mandals) and many other means, including elephants walking through streets with the family planning message on their sides.
Efforts to increase gender equity in norms and values have been built into many levels of communication. One example is a lively radio drama about a childless woman, in which messages are woven in through folk songs to point out that childlessness is more often caused by male than female sterility, and mocking mothers-in-law who refuse to believe their precious son can be deficient in any way. Popular soap operas portray women who interact confidently and effectively in the public domain. Sensitive to the power and outreach of public and private television, an increasingly vigilant network of critics has been engaged in monitoring and critiquing the electronic media in its portrayal of women.
Since the early 1990s, with the advent of foreign-based satellite TV and local cable networks which could provide mass entertainment without the handicap of weaving in social and educative messages, the state has been forced to adopt more commercial criteria in its programming to avoid losing its audience altogether. As a result, there is less emphasis on messages to improve gender equity, both in the programs as well as in their accompanying advertisements.
The Indian film industry consists largely of movies created for mass entertainment, in which “good women” are typically portrayed in roles of chaste self-sacrificing wives and obedient daughters-in-law. Scenes portraying violence against women are also common in these films. Feminists and media advocacy groups have been active in protesting against this, though not all are agreed that stricter censorship is the answer.

Women’s organizations
Through the nineteenth century, women’s causes were championed mostly by male social reformers, some of whom also founded women’s organizations. In the early twentieth century some influential women’s organizations were set up by upper class women, which became active in mobilizing opinion for reform of various kinds, including demanding universal female suffrage. From the 1930s, people were increasingly swept up in the independence movement, in which women of all classes were centrally involved. At the time of Independence, women’s organizations actively lobbied for reforms, and as described above were successful in obtaining a strong official commitment to gender equality.
The women’s movement also received a boost from the international interest in the UN Decade for Women. The government was active in this endeavor, setting up a very competent Committee on the Status of Women in India to assess the effects of government policy with reference to women’s legal status, educational levels, economic roles, health and family planning, and to make policy recommendations in these regards. The ensuing report (Government of India 1974) was very thorough, and helped set the agenda both for a more interventionist approach by the government and for political activism by women’s organizations.
As a result of combined efforts of women’s groups, a series of laws or legal amendments were passed during the 1980s as described above, on issues such as rape and dowry violence (Gandhi and Shah 1992; Kumar 1993). In line with the recommendations of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, a Commission was set up in 1987 to review the working conditions of women in the informal sector. Its task was to recommend measures to improve labor legislation and to ensure women greater access to credit facilities19. However, with the increased market orientation of the economy in the 1990s, these concerns are receiving less attention.


IV Conclusions
At the beginning of this century, the educated elites in all three countries were preoccupied with similar concerns arising largely out of contact with the outside world. They all felt the threat of modern military power: much of India was a British colony; China was increasingly controlled by European powers and by Japan; and Korea was under Japanese colonial occupation. The elites in these countries felt that their societies urgently needed to “modernize” to enable them to assert their identity and engage on more equal terms with the outside world.
Information on how to modernize was collected through firsthand exposure as well as contact with the Christian missionaries who were active in all three countries, especially in setting up schools and health clinics. Through these sources, the local elites became conscious that improving women’s welfare was a key element of “modernization”. Some of the worst iniquities perpetrated on women were targeted for change, and the principle of educating girls was accepted.
Around 1950, all three countries had new beginnings with new regimes in power. Their attention focussed on how to transform their poor agrarian societies into modern industrialized economies. By the 1960s, they perceived that this required urgent efforts to reduce population growth. They launched intensive and successful family planning programs, which have frequently been insensitively implemented but nevertheless substantially improved women’s reproductive health and helped closed the gender gap in adult survival (Figures 2 and 3).
19 National Commission on Self-Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector, 1988.
Here the broad similarities end. Shaped by the circumstances of their birth, these three nation-states took quite different paths of economic and social development. The Chinese Communist Party was deeply committed to equity, including gender equity. The Republic of Korea’s government opted for the path of export-oriented industrialization to achieve rapid economic growth, while preserving its culture and family system with all its implications for gender inequity. India became a democracy in which the influence of social movements for gender equity remained strong, but where the process of setting and implementing development agendas was constrained by the need to balance the competing political demands of an enormously heterogeneous people.
It is well known that these different paths have profoundly affected development outcomes in these countries, but they have also had tremendous impact on gender outcomes. China has succeeded not only in improving living standards but has also gone far towards establishing gender equity. The Republic of Korea has transformed living standards, but women’s subordination has been slow to change. India has achieved considerable improvement in gender equity as compared with the past, but the results are still uneven and the gaps still substantial, while both women and men continue to struggle with poverty, illiteracy and poor health conditions.
Several lessons emerge from the experience of these three countries. One is that even when states are interested in promoting gender equity, their actions are often constrained by the desire to maintain stable family structures: in order to maintain social stability; support of the old, unemployed and disabled; and raising good citizens for the future. Another lesson is that in these rigidly patrilineal settings, it is very difficult for the state to make peasant rules of residence and landownership more gender-equitable. This complex system of roles and rights forms part of the moral order of the society, and efforts to alter it are perceived as deeply invasive. Transition out of an agrarian economy loosens up these constraints to gender equity. In urban settings, it is also much easier for women to demand their rightful inheritance in urban areas, where legal resources are close at hand: in contrast to rural areas where such amenities are more distant and instead the woman is surrounded by entire male sublineages hostile to her intent. A third lesson is that the most successful attempts to change gender roles are those in which policies work synergistically to make greater opportunities available to women, while simultaneously reducing the normative constraints on women’s ability to avail of these opportunities. As the contrasting experiences of these three countries show, state policies profoundly shape gender relations such that very different gender outcomes have emerged from initially similar conditions of female social marginalization.
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Table 1 Number Of Girls "Missing" Per Thousand Livebirths
China S.Korea India
1989-90 1992 1981-91
No. of excess deaths age 0-4, per 1000 female livebirths1 13 . 36
No. of excess abortions 48 -81 70 9
per 1000 female livebirths2
Total number of girls missing 61 -94 70 45
per 1000 female livebirths
Total number of girls missing 30 -46 34 22
per 1000 livebirths (m+f) 0-4 mortality rate, 1991 61 14 . 17 3 109 -119

1 Computed from the sex differential in recorded mortality, compared with West model life tables for the prevailing life expectancy.
2 Computed from the recorded sex ratio at birth, assuming a normal ratio of
106. For China, the lower estimates are based on Zeng Yi et al's (1993) recalculation of the 1990 Census figures.
3 The lower estimate is from Korean lifetables, the higher estimates from
vital statistics.

Source: Das Gupta et al., 1997.
Computed from: Huang and Liu 1995; Sample Registration System of India;
1990 Census of China; Park and Cho 1995; Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Lin
Liangmin et al.1996; International Institute for Population Science 1995.

Table 2
GNP per capita and percent of population living in rural areas: India,
China and South Korea around 1950.

GNP per capita % rural
India 51.9 (1950) 82.7 (1951)
China 31.3 (1955) 89.4 (1953)
S.Korea 76.1 (1953) 82.8 (1949)
Sources:
1. Per capita income:

-S.M.Kansal.1974. Changes in the per capita income and the per capita availability of
essential commodities in India since 1931, New Delhi: Economic and Scientific Research
Foundation.
-PRC State Statistical Bureau. 1985. Statistical Yearbook of China, 1985 Oxford, New
York, Tokyo: Oxford University Press.
-The Bank of Korea. National Income Statistics Yearbook 1971.

2. Percent rural in national census held nearest to the year 1950: -Census of India 1951 -PRC State Statistical Bureau. 1985. Statistical Yearbook of China, 1985 Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Oxford University Press. -Lee On-Jook. 1980. Urban-to-Rural Return Migration in Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press
Table 3
Social and Economic Indicators, India, China, and South Korea (1995)

India China S. Korea
GNP per capita (US$) 340 620 9700
GNP per capita (US$, PPP*) 1400 2920 11450
% urban 27 30 81
% of GDP from agriculture 29 21 7
Male life expectancy at birth 62 68 68
Female life expectancy at birth 63 71 76
Total fertility rate 3.2 1.9 1.8
Female adult illiteracy rate 62 27 3
Female labor force participation 32 45 40
Infant Mortality rate per thousand) 68 34 10
% of poverty ($1 a day) (PPP*) 52.5** 29.42*** NA

Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators 1997. *: Purchasing Power Parity **: 1992 ***: 1993.

S.Korea 2000
China 2000
India 2000



Note: The coordinates of each country are imprecise and intended merely to illustrate broad differences between the countries.
32
Figure 2
Trends in the ratio of Male to Female Mortality in India, 1970-1990



Figure 3
Trends in the ratio of Male to Female Mortality in China, 1973-1987


1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1 1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6

0 1 5 10152025 30354045 50556065 70 7580
Age

Source: Hang, Yonqing and Liu, Yan. Mortality Data of China Population. China Population Publishing House, Beijing, 1995. Pg.19-20